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This Article considers the scope of the Federal Reserve’s emergency
loan-making powers and analyzes their use during the recent financial
crisis. It argues that many of the Fed’s responses to the crisis exceeded the
bounds of its statutory authority.
In unusual and exigent circumstances, § 13(3) of the Federal Reserve
Act empowers the Fed to provide an uncapped amount of liquidity to the
financial system. It may, with the approval of the U.S. Treasury, establish
programs of broad-based eligibility and lend freely against sufficient
collateral. Before its amendment by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act, § 13(3) also allowed the Fed, acting alone,
to extend credit to particular individuals, partnerships, and corporations.
From 2008 to 2009, the Fed invoked this authority repeatedly to purchase
assets, lend money, and establish schemes that sought to restore market
stability. However, this Article argues that § 13(3) was and remains a
loan-making power of narrowly defined scope. On this view, the Fed’s
asset purchases and certain of its lending activities raise great concerns.
The impact of these concerns has yet to be addressed in the literature.
This Article first looks to the history of § 13(3) by tracing the
development and use of the legislation. It then examines the transactional
structures that the Fed created during the crisis and assesses these against
the scope of its § 13(3) powers. Next, it evaluates the case for reform with
which Congress was confronted, and its response in the Dodd-Frank Act.
It concludes that the reforms to § 13(3) that the Act makes are to be
welcomed overall, even though a key ambiguity remains in the statute.
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Finally, it traces the Fed’s new authority in the area of systemic risk
regulation.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act is a powerful legislative
provision. At present, it empowers the Federal Reserve (the ―Fed‖), in
unusual and exigent circumstances, to provide an uncapped amount of
liquidity to the financial system. With the approval of the Treasury, the
Fed may establish programs of broad-based eligibility and lend freely
against sufficient collateral.
Before the passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (the ―Dodd-Frank Act‖), § 13(3) was broader in
scope. It permitted the Fed to provide credit to particular individuals,
partnerships, and corporations. During the financial crisis of 2008-2009,
the Fed used § 13(3) extensively. It made loans to some financial
institutions and bought assets from others. It established broader schemes,
open to a number of institutions, in order to restore market stability. And
in at least one case, it refused to provide any credit, resulting in the failure
of a major investment bank.
This Article has two goals. The first is to argue that many of the Fed‘s
actions during the financial crisis exceeded the bounds of its statutory
authority. This argument has yet to receive any sustained analysis in the
literature. However, it is one with which Congress now appears to have
agreed. The Article‘s second goal is to evaluate the most recent reforms of
§ 13(3) contained in the Dodd-Frank Act. These have the express purpose
of realigning the Fed‘s role with that of a lender of last resort. They also
seek to address various concerns about the scope of the Fed‘s authority.
Parts II and III of this Article trace the use and development of § 13(3)
from its enactment to the time of the financial crisis. The purpose of Part
IV is to set out the Fed‘s responses to the financial crisis and to analyze
these against the scope of its § 13(3) powers.
Part V then seeks to ascertain the intended purpose of § 13(3). It
considers the case for reform with which Congress was faced. It then goes
on to evaluate the changes to § 13(3) made by the Dodd-Frank Act in light
of the legislature‘s vision for § 13(3) – secured lending against sufficient
collateral – and the Fed‘s departure from that vision. It examines an
important ambiguity that remains in the statute.
And finally, it
demonstrates that the Fed‘s assumed responsibility for resolving systemic
solvency risks now lies primarily in the province of another entity.
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II.

THE FED‘S POWERS: § 13(3) OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT

In this Part, we will consider § 13(3) as it stood at the time of the
financial crisis of 2008-2009. This approach will allow us to evaluate the
legality of the Fed‘s actions during this period. Furthermore, when we
come to assess the impact of the Dodd-Frank Act in Part V below, we will
also be in a position to understand the key concerns to which Congress
sought to respond.
At the time of the financial crisis, § 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act
(the ―FRA‖) provided:
In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, by the affirmative vote of not less
than five members, may authorize any Federal reserve bank,
during such periods as the said board may determine, at rates
established in accordance with the provisions of section 357 of
this title,1 to discount for any individual, partnership, or
corporation, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange when such notes,
drafts, and bills of exchange are indorsed or otherwise secured to
the satisfaction of the Federal reserve bank: Provided,
that
before discounting any such note, draft, or bill of exchange for an
individual or a partnership or corporation the Federal reserve
bank shall obtain evidence that such individual, partnership, or
corporation is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations
from other banking institutions.
All such discounts for
individuals, partnerships, or corporations shall be subject to such
limitations, restrictions, and regulations as the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System may prescribe.2

1. 12 U.S.C. § 357 (2006). Section 357 empowers Federal Reserve Banks to set rates
of discount. This provision states that each reserve bank may ―establish from time to time,
subject to review and determination of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System, rates of discount to be charged . . . for each class of paper, which shall be fixed with
a view of accommodating commerce and business, but each such bank shall establish such
rates every fourteen days, or oftener if deemed necessary by the Board.‖ § 357.
2. Federal Reserve Act § 13(3), 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006). With the exception of the
word ―Provided,‖ all emphasis is added.
For further discussion of § 13(3) and the other legal authority that the executive
invoked during the crisis, see generally John M. Brandow et al., Davis Polk, Financial Crisis
Manual, A Guide to the Laws, Regulations and Contracts of the Financial Crisis (2009),
available
at
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/d1ab7627-e45d-4d35-b6f1ef356ba686f2/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2a31cab4-3682-420e-926f054c72e3149d/fcm.pdf (providing an overview of the events of the financial crisis and
describing the pre-reform U.S. laws, regulations, and contracts relevant to financial
institutions); Thomas Porter, The Federal Reserve’s Catch-22: A Legal Analysis of the
Federal Reserve’s Emergency Powers, 13 N.C. BANKING INST. 483 available at
http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/journals/articles/85.pdf (discussing the legal basis for
the Bear Stearns bailout and the policy issues raised thereby); Christian A. Johnson, Exigent
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This provision empowered the Fed to lend to ―any individual,
partnership, or corporation.‖3 In more precise terms, the Fed could, in
unusual and exigent circumstances, discount financial instruments for such
individuals, partnerships, or corporations as were unable to secure
adequate credit from other banks.4 The financial instruments had to be
indorsed or otherwise secured.5 The process required the affirmative vote
of not less than five members.6 We will consider each of these statutory
requirements in turn. Where appropriate, we will use the present tense to
indicate features that remain in the statute.
A.

Discounting
Under § 13(3), the Fed7 could authorize its Reserve Banks to discount

and Unusual Circumstances: The Federal Reserve and the U.S. Financial Crisis, EUR. BUS.
ORG.
L.
REV.
(forthcoming
2010),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1584731 (considering the Federal
Reserve‘s responses to the crisis and assessing various options for reform); and Steven M.
Davidoff & David T. Zaring, Regulation by Deal: The Government's Response to the
Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (analyzing the way in which the government‘s
deal-making during the financial crisis interacted with its legal authority).
3. Federal Reserve Act § 13(3).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. The Federal Reserve System is the central banking system of the United States. It
comprises a group of Federal Reserve Banks, which are overseen by a Board of Governors.
Banks with federal charters (―national banks‖) must join. Banks with state charters (―state
banks‖) may choose whether or not to join. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 222-223 (2010);
RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 12-13
(4th ed. 2009). The text that follows will use the term the ―Federal Reserve‖ and its
abbreviation, the ―Fed‖, interchangeably. However, references to the Fed‘s actions will
refer primarily to those of its Board of Governors.
The Federal Reserve Banks are the means by which the Fed operates the payment
system and implements its decisions on monetary policy. There is a Reserve Bank in each
of twelve geographical districts in the United States. 12 U.S.C. §§ 222–223. Each has a
nine-member board of directors. 12 U.S.C. § 302. Reserve Banks hold reserves on behalf
of their member banks. 12 U.S.C. § 461. Member banks, in turn, own shares in Reserve
Banks. 12 U.S.C. § 321–323.
The Board of Governors is an agency of the federal government. It has seven
members, who are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. 12 U.S.C. §
241. The Board has two main functions. First, it regulates state member banks and bank
holding companies (and it oversees Reserve Banks). 12 U.S.C. § 248. The Fed shares its
regulatory role with other agencies. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
regulates national banks. § 1. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation regulates state
nonmember banks. 12 U.S.C. § 266. A number of state agencies also oversee state banks.
CARNELL ET AL., supra, at 61-63. Consumer protection is another facet of banking
regulation. The Fed has authority under certain statutes to promulgate regulations for this
purpose. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 226 (2010) (codifying Regulation Z, implementing the Truth
in Lending Act); CARNELL ET AL., supra, at ch. 7.

MEHRAFINALIZED_FIVE_UPDATED AFTER PUBLICATION

3/2/2011 8:48 PM

2010]LEGAL AUTHORITY IN UNUSUAL AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 225
certain financial instruments (notes, drafts, and bills of exchange) for any
individual, partnership, or corporation.8 The process of discounting has a
precise meaning in this context. A discount is a loan.9 When a bank
The Board‘s second function is to implement monetary policy. It does so in two
ways. The first is by means of its open-market operations. These involve the purchase and
sale of U.S. government securities. David H. Small & James A. Clouse, The Scope of
Monetary Policy Actions Authorized Under the Federal Reserve Act 1 (FEDS Working
Paper No. 2004-40, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=622342. In this way, the
Fed is able to increase or decrease, respectively, the amount of money available in the
economy. Id. These operations are directed by the Federal Open Market Committee (which
consists of Reserve Bank presidents and members of the Board). 12 U.S.C. § 263. The
second is by providing credit to banks at the discount window (which is operated by Reserve
Banks).
The discount window provisions are contained in Federal Reserve Act § 13(2) and
certain other provisions of the Act. These provisions indicate that Reserve Banks may make
loans to banks against eligible collateral. Small & Clouse, supra, at 11. The term discount
window should be distinguished from the process of discounting (i.e., loan-making). This
does take place at the discount window, but it need not. It may also take place under the
Federal Reserve Act § 13(3) (under which the collateral requirements are not so strict). See
infra note 10.
8. Section 13(3) is not the only provision under which the Fed can make loans to
nonbanks. 12 U.S.C. § 347(c) permits lending to nonbanks so long as they provide Treasury
or agency securities as collateral. There is no requirement of unusual and exigent
circumstances. However, because of the demanding collateral requirement, this provision
would be of limited use in such circumstances. Small and Clouse point out that entities that
hold such instruments could easily sell them in the open market. Small & Clouse, supra
note 7, at 14.
9. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 374 (2nd ed. 1910), available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=R2c8AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA374.
Black‘s defines a
discount as ―the taking of interest in advance.‖ Id. (citing Fleckner v. Bank, 21 U. S. 338
(1823) (―A discount by a bank means a ‗drawback or deduction made upon its advances or
loans of money, upon negotiable paper or other evidences of debt . . . .‖); Weckler v. First
Nat‘l Bank, 42 Md. 581, 592 (Md. 1875) (―The ordinary meaning of the term ‗to discount‘
is to take interest in advance, and in banking is a mode of loaning money. It is the advance
of money not due till some future period, less the interest which would be due thereon when
payable.‖); and City Bank of Columbus v. Bruce, 17 N.Y. 507, 515 (N.Y. 1858)
(―Discounting of a note by a bank is understood to consist in the lending of money upon it,
and deducting the interest or premium in advance.‖)). The Dictionary also references Nat’l
Bank v. Johnston, in which a discount was explained to be ―the difference between the price
and the amount of the debt, the evidence of which is transferred. That difference represents
interest charged . . . .‖ 104 U.S. 271, 276 (U.S. 1881). Cf. 12 U.S.C. § 355 and discussion
infra Part IV.A.1.ii (discussing purchases rather than discounts).
Section 13(3) was enacted on July 21, 1932. 12 U.S.C. § 343. The 1910 edition of
Black‘s is the closest edition to this date that contains an entry for ―discount.‖ The term is
not defined in the third edition (1933). See also Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 77
(U.S. 1990) Rehnquist, C.J, dissenting on the facts) (―In construing any terms whose
meanings are less than plain, we depend on the common understanding of those terms at the
time of the statute‘s creation.‖)
In Reves, the majority of the Court held that certain demand notes issued by the
Farmer‘s Cooperative of Arkansas and Oklahoma were securities within the meaning of §
3(a)(10) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Id. at 70. Furthermore, the majority held
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discounts a financial instrument for a borrower, it accepts that instrument
as collateral and then lends out a sum of money that is less than the face
value of the instrument.10 In this way, the bank obtains an interest payment
in advance.11 There is a clear difference between a loan and an asset
purchase. In a secured loan transaction, the borrower receives a loan and
provides collateral. Ownership of this collateral remains in the borrower.
The lender obtains only a security interest: the right to have recourse to
these assets if the borrower defaults. In a purchase, on the other hand, the
purchaser obtains ownership of an asset once the transaction has been
completed.12
that the exemption in that provision for ―any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker‘s
acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months‖ did
not apply to demand notes, because demand could potentially be made ―many years or
decades into the future.‖ Id. at 73. In dicta, there is also some discussion, not of immediate
relevance, as to whether this statutory exemption applies only to commercial paper. Id. at
70-71, 74-76, 79-82. Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the minority, cited the third
edition of Black‘s Law Dictionary and a legal treatise by Bigelow in support of the
proposition that demand notes have an immediate maturity at the time of their issuance, and
so come within the statutory exemption. Id. at 77. The majority rejected this argument,
holding that that these sources articulated rules of state law, which could not provide an
answer to the federal question before the Court. Id. at 72. In the present case, however,
there is specific federal precedent as to the meaning of the term ―discount.‖
10. Discounting for banks takes place at the discount window. Discounting for
nonbanks takes place under § 13(3). When a Reserve Bank makes a discount at the discount
window, it provides credit to a bank and takes as collateral ―eligible paper representing
loans made by the [bank] to its own customers.‖ HOWARD HACKLEY, LENDING FUNCTIONS
OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANKS: A HISTORY 83 (Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System 1973). Eligible instruments are primarily those that are issued or used for
agricultural, industrial, or commercial purposes. 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006). On the other
hand, when a Reserve Bank makes a § 13(3) loan to a nonbank, the collateral requirements
are not so strict. See infra Part III.A.
Certain instruments other than those set out in Federal Reserve Act § 13(2), 12 U.S.C.
§ 343 (2006) are also eligible for discount at the discount window. These are demand bills
of exchange relating to the domestic shipment of agricultural goods, 12 U.S.C. § 344,
acceptances relating to the shipment of goods and acceptances to create dollar exchanges, 12
U.S.C. § 346, and notes drawn for an agricultural purpose, 12 U.S.C. § 348. See also Small
& Clouse, supra note 7, at 11 (discussing the permissible scope of discount-window
lending).
11. The discount differs from the haircut that the bank applies to the value of the
collateral. The haircut compensates the bank for the risk of default. Small & Clouse, supra
note 7, at 13 n.29.
12. See Farmers & Mech. Bank v. Baldwin, 23 Minn. 198, 206 (Minn. 1876)
(―Discounting a note and buying it are not identical in meaning, the latter expression being
used to denote the transaction ‗when the seller does not endorse the note, and is not
accountable for it . . . .‘‖ (quoting 1 Bouv. Law Dict. title Discount, citing Pothier, De l‘
Usure, 128)).
The point here is that when an instrument is discounted for a borrower (under a
recourse loan transaction), he remains liable for any shortfall in the value of his collateral.
When an instrument is purchased from a borrower, he is no longer liable for any shortfall.
However, there is one case in which a loan can have the same effect as an asset purchase.
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B.

Notes, drafts, and bills of exchange

Three types of financial instruments are eligible for discount under §
13(3). These are notes, drafts, and bills of exchange. A note is an
unconditional promise to pay.13 This is a two-party instrument in which A
promises to pay B.14 Both drafts and bills of exchange, which are
synonymous terms, constitute orders to pay.15 These are three-party
instruments in which A orders that B make a payment to C.16 Notes, drafts,
and bills of exchange are all credit instruments. It has been stated that this
list provides ―virtually no restrictions on the form a written credit
instrument must take in order to be eligible for discount.‖17 However,
corporate shares, which are not credit instruments, would appear to be
ineligible for discount under § 13(3).18
C.

Unusual and exigent circumstances

A § 13(3) discount may only occur when circumstances are both
unusual and exigent. This appears to be an objective test. The terms are
not defined in the statute, but it is evident that they set a high threshold. In
the event that the Fed determines that unusual and exigent circumstances
exist, there is no statutory requirement that it announce this publicly. A
strong argument against such an obligation is that the announcement may
have a negative effect on market confidence and so catalyze a self-fulfilling
prophecy.19
This is when a bank makes a non-recourse loan to a borrower who defaults. Here, the bank
will end up with ownership of the collateral in the same way as if it had purchased it.
However, there is a conceptual distinction between these two transactions. In a loan
transaction, the bank‘s goal at the outset is to lend money against the borrower‘s collateral,
not to acquire it. The bank makes the loan on the understanding that there is some chance
that it will be repaid.
13. U.C.C. §§ 3-103, 3-104 (2005); 3 WEST‘S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 15–16
(2nd ed. 2005);. Small & Clouse, supra note 7, at 26-27.
14. 3 WEST‘S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW 15. Here, A is the maker and B is the
payee. Id.
15. Id. at 16.
16. Id. Here, A is the drawer, B is the drawee, and C is the payee. A commonly used
type of draft is a check, in which case a bank is the drawee. Id.
17. Small & Clouse, supra note 7, at 15.
18. Small and Clouse indicate that shares may constitute permissible collateral under §
10B of the FRA. Small & Clouse, supra note 7, at 12. However, this provision is
concerned with the Fed‘s power to make an advance. In the case of an advance, a borrower
provides his own promissory note (rather than making a pledge of third-party indebtedness).
See infra note 79.
19. Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., Gen. Counsel, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., The Legal Position
of the Central Bank, The Case of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 6 (Jan. 19, 2009),
http://lse.ac.uk/fmg/documents/events/conferences/2009/regulatoryResponse/1160_Baxter.p
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For such individual, partnership, or corporation

The Fed could lend to any individual, partnership, or corporation.20 It
is important to emphasize a feature of the statutory language contained in
the proviso. Before extending credit to an individual, partnership, or
corporation, the Reserve Bank had to obtain evidence that such individual,
partnership, or corporation was unable to secure adequate credit
accommodations from other banking institutions. Hence the recipient of
the loan had to be the same party that was unable to obtain credit from
elsewhere.21
E.

Unable to secure adequate credit from other banks

Normally, a borrower is ―unable to secure adequate credit
accommodations from other banking institutions‖22 because circumstances
are unusual and exigent – and so in practice, these two requirements are
fulfilled together.
F.

Indorsed or otherwise secured

Any financial instruments to be discounted must be indorsed
(endorsed) or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Reserve Bank.
The process of endorsement aims to provide the Bank with a measure of
protection against loss. When a party unqualifiedly endorses commercial
paper, it assumes secondary liability on that paper.23
Following
endorsement, the Bank can bring a claim against the endorser in the event

df.
20. A subsidiary issue, as Gordon and Muller point out, is whether the Fed can lend to a
limited liability company (as it did in some of the cases to be considered below). Is this an
individual, partnership, or corporation? The LLC form did not exist when the statute was
amended in 1932. Even so, they look to the history of the bill, and note that it was expanded
at a later stage to include ―partnership.‖ Jeffrey N. Gordon & Christopher Muller, Avoiding
Eight-Alarm Fires in the Political Economy of Systemic Risk Management 41 (European
Corporate Governance Institute Working Paper Series in Finance, Paper No. 277, 2010),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553880. They suggest that ―corporation‖ should also
be read broadly. Id. This approach seems persuasive.
21. But see infra Part IV.A.1.ii (considering the argument that ―such individual‖ may
refer to not only the immediate borrower but also the beneficiary—the ultimate borrower).
22. Federal Reserve Act § 13(3).
23. WEST‘S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, supra note 13, at 20 (discussing the
process of unqualified endorsement and explaining that secondary liability occurs ―when the
individual who has the primary duty to pay defaults on his or her obligation.‖). See also
U.C.C. § 3-204 (2005) (indicating that by endorsing an instrument, a party may incur
liability on that instrument); HACKLEY, supra note 10, at 129 (indicating that under § 13(3),
banks can seek repayment by resort to security or the endorsement of a third party).
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that the issuer of the paper does not pay.24
An alternative way for a Reserve Bank to protect itself (and satisfy the
statutory requirements) is to take some security for its loan. The phrase
―secured to the satisfaction of‖ indicates that a Reserve Bank has some
measure of discretion in the collateral it chooses to accept. But it does not
follow that the Reserve Bank enjoys absolute discretion. It would seem
that the borrower has to provide some appropriate security for the loan. If
the Fed could make loans against no collateral, this would negate the
statute‘s express reference to some security.25
G.

By the affirmative vote of not less than five members

This requirement relates to the voting procedure. At least five of the
seven members of the Fed‘s Board of Governors must affirmatively vote to
authorize the extension of credit by a Federal Reserve Bank.
Another section of the statute, § 11(r), provides an alternative voting
procedure for cases where fewer than five members of the Board are
available. If the Fed determines that emergency action is necessary to
prevent serious harm to the financial system, there can instead be a
unanimous vote by at least two members of the Board. The Fed used this
procedure in one case.26
III. THE HISTORY OF § 13(3)
We are now in a position to consider how § 13(3) developed and how
it was used before the financial crisis. The legislative history indicates that
the provision as enacted contained three important restrictions. These
would have precluded many of the Fed‘s responses to the financial crisis,
had they not been removed by a series of amendments. The provision‘s
historical use reflects a similar point. Before 2008, the Fed used § 13(3)
only sparingly. Loans were made only from 1932 to 1936, and these were
limited in number.

24. Id. Can a borrower under § 13(3) endorse a note that it itself has issued? It would
appear not. Such a transaction would constitute unsecured lending (backed only by the
borrower‘s bare promise to pay). This goes against the requirement that a loan be endorsed
or secured to the satisfaction of the Reserve Bank. Furthermore, such a transaction
resembles an advance. See infra note 79.
25. But see infra Part IV.A.2 (assessing the argument that the Commercial Paper
Funding Facility constituted an example of unsecured lending under § 13(3)).
26. See infra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the Fed‘s overnight loan to
Bear Stearns).
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The legislative history of § 13(3)

The Fed was first granted its § 13(3) lending powers by an amendment
in the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of 1932.27 Section 210 of
this statute provided:
Section 13 of the Federal Reserve Act, as amended, is further
amended by adding after the second paragraph thereof the
following new paragraph:
In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Federal Reserve
Board, by the affirmative vote of not less than five members, may
authorize any Federal reserve bank, during such periods as the
said board may determine, at rates established in accordance with
the provisions of section 14, subdivision (d), of this Act, to
discount for any individual, partnership, or corporation, notes,
drafts, and bills of exchange of the kinds and maturities made
eligible for discount for member banks under other provisions of
this Act when such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are
indorsed and otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Federal
reserve bank: Provided, That before discounting any such note,
draft, or bill of exchange for an individual or a partnership or
corporation the Federal reserve bank shall obtain evidence that
such individual, partnership, or corporation is unable to secure
adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions.
All such discounts for individuals, partnerships, or corporations
shall be subject to such limitations, restrictions, and regulations
as the Federal Reserve Board may prescribe.28
The first restriction in § 13(3) as enacted was that before a Federal
Reserve Bank could discount a financial instrument, the instrument had to
be ―indorsed and otherwise secured‖ to the Bank‘s satisfaction. Even
though the text appears to be both conjunctive and disjunctive (―and
otherwise‖), it was arguable that the collateral had to be both endorsed and
secured. This constraint was modified by § 322 of the Banking Act of
1935, which replaced ―and‖ with ―or.‖29 Thereafter, a Reserve Bank could
accept either an endorsement or some security.
The second restriction in § 13(3) as enacted was more significant. A
Federal Reserve Bank could discount for an individual only those financial
instruments ―of the kinds and maturities made eligible for discount for
member banks.‖30 This meant that loans to individuals, partnerships, and
27. Ch. 520, 47 Stat. 709 (1932) (providing for a public works program to create
employment and extending the powers of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, a
government agency that made loans to banks and other companies).
28. Id. With the exception of ―Provided,‖ all emphasis is added.
29. The Banking Act of 1935, 12 U.S.C. § 228 (1935).
30. Federal Reserve Act § 13(3).
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corporations were subject to the same collateral requirements as loans to
member banks.
Lending to member banks takes place at a Reserve Bank‘s discount
window.31 Under the Federal Reserve Act § 13(2), Reserve Banks may
accept as collateral notes, drafts, and bills of exchange that have been
―issued or drawn for agricultural, industrial, or commercial purposes,‖ or
that have proceeds that will be used for such purposes.32 Such instruments
must have a maturity period of no more than ninety days.33 Furthermore,
instruments ―issued or drawn for the purpose of carrying or trading in
stocks, bonds or other securities,‖ other than Treasury securities, are
expressly ineligible for discount.
By specifying the collateral eligible for discount, the legislation as
enacted limited the Fed‘s ability to extend credit to investment banks and
other similar firms under § 13(3). The majority of their assets consist of
investment instruments, against which no loans could then be made.
This constraint was abolished by § 473 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (the ―FDICIA‖).34 This provision
31. Federal Reserve Act § 19(e), 12 U.S.C. § 463 (1913) (stating that non-member
banks could receive loans indirectly through member banks, but only with the Fed‘s
permission). Cf. Federal Reserve Act § 19(b), 12 U.S.C. § 461 (1913) (indicating that at
present, all depositary institutions that hold transaction accounts are entitled to the same
discount and borrowing privileges as member banks). See also HACKLEY, supra note 10, at
119 (discussing cases where the Fed expressly authorized member banks to obtain loans for
nonmember banks).
32. Federal Reserve Act § 13(2), 12 U.S.C § 343 (2006). The test for eligible paper
under this provision looks to the nature of the underlying transaction rather than to the form
of the paper. Small & Clouse, supra note 7, at 8 (citing HAROLD L. REED, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY (1922)). There are in fact two tests for eligible
paper under the statute. Either the paper has its origins in a given commercial transaction
(for example, where a company buys goods and provides its paper to the seller as payment),
or the paper is subsequently used as collateral by another borrower who seeks funding for
commercial purposes. See WH Steiner, Paper Eligible for Rediscount at Federal Reserve
Banks: Theories Underlying Federal Reserve Board Rulings, 34 THE JOURNAL OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY 327, 338-39 (1926) (stating that a paper may be eligible for discount ―because
issued or drawn for an agricultural or commercial purpose‖, or ―because the proceeds have
been or are to be used for an agricultural or commercial purpose‖).
33. See HACKLEY, supra note 10, at 14 (explaining that the reasoning behind the ninetyday maturity period is that such paper is highly liquid and ―almost the exact equivalent of
cash‖). A longer maturity period applies to agricultural paper. The reasoning that underlies
the distinction is that agricultural loans are normally made for a period that corresponds to
the crop season. Id. at 43. Hence § 13A(1) of the FRA provides for a nine-month maturity
period for notes ―drawn for an agricultural purpose, or based upon live stock.‖ This
provision was added to the FRA by the Agricultural Credits Act of 1923, which was enacted
in response to a decrease in farm prices during the 1920s. Id. at 44.
34. See Walker F. Todd, FDICIA’s Emergency Liquidity Provisions, 29 FED. RES.
BANK
OF
CLEVELAND
ECO.
REV.
16,
19
(1993),
available
at
http://www.clevelandfed.org/research/Review/1993/93-q3-todd.pdf (stating that:
[O]ne of the potentially troublesome aspects of the FDICIA amendment of
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removed the phrase ―of the kinds and maturities made eligible for discount
for member banks under other provisions of this Act‖ from § 13(3).35 As a
result, all notes, drafts, and bills of exchange became eligible for discount,
so long as they were endorsed or secured to the satisfaction of the Federal
Reserve Bank.
The third restriction was procedural. Section 13(3) requires the
affirmative approval of five of the Fed‘s Governors before a loan can be
made. As indicated above, though, an alternative voting procedure has
since been enacted. Section 11(r) states that there may instead be a
unanimous vote of all (but at least two) available Fed Governors if the Fed
determines that emergency action is necessary to prevent serious harm to
the financial system.36 If certain documentary requirements were met, then
this procedure was sufficient for action to be taken under § 13(3).37
B.

The Fed’s use of § 13(3) before the financial crisis

The Fed‘s Board of Governors issued a circular on July 26, 1932, five
days after § 13(3) was enacted.38 This became effective on August 1,
1932.39 It gave Reserve Banks the authority for a period of six months to
make loans under § 13(3).40 This initial period of authority was extended
for successive six-month periods lasting until July 31, 1936.41
The Fed did not prescribe any formal regulations. Instead, in its
circular, it outlined the legal and procedural requirements that borrowers
Section 13 (3) is that it appears to reflect a motive or spirit that contradicts that
of the FDICIA provisions intended both to limit Reserve Banks‘ loans to
undercapitalized depository institutions and to make it more difficult for the
Federal Reserve to treat an institution as too big to fail. If the amendment was
intended to provide a vehicle for possible Federal Reserve treatment of a failing
securities firm as too big to fail, then it arguably constitutes a contradictory
extension of the same federal safety net that was retrenched in other parts of
FDICIA. . . .).
35. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 § 473, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1811 (1991).
36. Federal Reserve Act § 11(r), 12 U.S.C. § 248(r) (2006).
37. See id. (listing the various requirements, for example that the Board‘s ―written
findings shall be included in the record of the action and in the official minutes of the Board,
and copies of such record shall be provided as soon as practicable to the members of the
Board who were not available to participate‖).
38. Discounts for Individuals, Partnerships, and Corporations, 18 FED. RES. BULL. 473,
518
(Aug.
1932),
available
at
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/frb/1932/download/51730/frb_081932.pdf.
39. Id. at 474.
40. Id. at 474, 518.
41. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Discounts for Individuals, Partnerships,
and Corporations, 22 FED. RES. BULL. 71, 123-24 (Feb. 1936), available at
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publications/frb/1936/download/35757/frb_021936.pdf.
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applying for credit from a Reserve Bank would have to follow. They had
to state the purpose for which they would use the loan.42 They had to
provide evidence to demonstrate that their collateral was not only legally
eligible but also acceptable from a credit standpoint.43 Further, they had to
provide a statement of the efforts they had made to obtain adequate credit
accommodations from other banking institutions, including their names and
addresses, the dates on which they applied for credit, and the reasons, if
any, given for refusal of credit.44 Reserve Banks were in turn obliged to
ascertain that there was a reasonable need for such credit, and that the
collateral was adequate to provide protection against losses.45
1.

Lending from 1932–1936

Between 1932 and 1936, the Fed made loans to 123 entities.46 The
largest of these loans was for $300,000.47 The aggregate amount of these
loans was $1.5 million (about $23 million in today‘s dollars).48
It can be seen that lending under § 13(3) was limited during this
period. There are three reasons why this was so. First, as we saw above,
the provision as enacted contained collateral constraints.49 Paper issued for
the purpose of trading in investment securities was expressly ineligible for
discount.50 Second, another legislative provision (§ 13(b)) was added to the
FRA in 1934.51 This allowed Reserve Banks to make advances of working
capital to established industrial and commercial firms that could not obtain
credit from elsewhere.52 Third, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation,
formed in 1932, made loans to banks, insurance companies, and other

42. Discounts for Individuals, Partnerships, and Corporations, supra note 38, at 519.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 518.
46. HACKLEY, supra note 10, at 130. See also Baxter, supra note 19, at 5 (stating that
borrowers included a typewriter manufacturer, a vegetable grower, and a brewer); Gordon
and Muller, supra note 20, at 30 (noting that borrowers were primarily ―industrial‖ firms
rather than nonbank financial firms).
47. HACKLEY, supra note 10, at 130.
48. Baxter, supra note 19, at 13.
49. See infra Part III.A (explaining that before the FDICIA, § 13(3) loans to
individuals, partnerships, and corporations were subject to the same collateral requirements
as loans to member banks). For this reason, notes, drafts, and bills of exchange ―issued or
drawn for the purpose of carrying or trading in stocks, bonds, or other investment
securities,‖ other than U.S. government securities, were ineligible for discount. Federal
Reserve Act § 13(2), 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2006).
50. Federal Reserve Act § 13(2).
51. Industrial Advances Act, 12 U.S.C. § 352a (1934).
52. But see the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, 15 U.S.C. § 696 (2009)
(repealing the Industrial Advances Act).
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businesses on more attractive terms.53
2.

Lending from 1937–2008

In later years, the Fed did occasionally activate its § 13(3) authority to
lend. However, it did not actually make any further loans until 2008. For
example, in 1966, for an eight-month period, the Fed authorized Reserve
Banks to lend to mutual banks and savings and loans associations, which
were then under liquidity pressures.54 In 1969, for a seven-month period, it
authorized Reserve Banks to lend to banks facing competition for deposits
from higher-yielding investments.55
In 1970, the Penn Central Railroad suffered from financial difficulties.
The Fed stated that it would provide assistance at the discount window to
businesses that held its commercial paper.56 Overall, though, no liquidity
crisis arose, and so the Fed made no loans. In 1975, the Fed refused to
provide credit to the City of New York, which was then undergoing
financial difficulties. Instead, it acted as fiscal agent for loans made by the
Treasury to the City.57 It assumed a similar role when the corporations
Lockheed and Chrysler sought credit in 1971 and 1979, respectively.58
In 1980, the Fed activated its § 13(3) authority in contemplation of
making a loan to a Michigan non-member bank.59 Finally, in 1991, the Fed
refused to make a $25 billion loan to the Bank Insurance Fund of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, despite requests by the Treasury
and the Chairman of the Corporation.60
IV. THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
The Fed used § 13(3) a number of times during the financial crisis. It
provided assistance to individual firms. It also established broader schemes
to restore market stability. In the analysis that follows, we will adopt a
structural classification. From the standpoint of statutory authority, it will
be argued that the most problematic cases are those in which the Fed used §
53. David Fettig, Lender of More than Last Resort, THE REGION, Dec. 2002, at 44–45,
available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=3392.
54. See Baxter, supra note 19, at 5.
55. Id. at 5–6.
56. Anna J. Schwartz, Senior Research Fellow, The Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research,
The Misuse of the Fed‘s Discount Window, Speech at the Sixth Annual Homer Jones
Memorial
Lecture
at
St.
Louis
University,
62–63
(Apr.
9,
1992),
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/92/09/Misuse_Sep_Oct1992.pdf).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Baxter, supra note 19, at 6.
60. Schwartz, supra note 56.
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13(3) to purchase assets and those in which made loans against instruments
other than credit instruments. We will consider asset purchases first. By
way of comparison, we will next consider loan transactions, most of which
fall more clearly within the scope of the Fed‘s § 13(3) authority. Finally,
we will consider the highest profile case in which the Fed made no use of §
13(3): that of Lehman Brothers.
A.

Asset purchases

In a number of cases, the Fed used § 13(3) to buy assets from troubled
financial institutions. In form, these transactions were structured as loans.
But in substance, they permitted the Fed to move assets off the balance
sheets of these institutions and onto its own.61
We saw above that when the Fed used § 13(3), the provision
contemplated only secured loan transactions. How, then, was the Fed able
to effect these asset purchases? The answer came in the form of a special
purpose vehicle (SPV). An SPV is an entity with distinct corporate
personality from its parent. It is formed to carry out a specific task – here,
an asset purchase.62
61. See Baxter, supra note 19, at 13 (explaining that to achieve this result, the Fed
created SPVs ―[w]hen we created Maiden Lane I to facilitate the JPMC-Bear merger, this
lawyer was thinking the SPV would stand with its own balance sheet, independent of the
Federal Reserve. The accounting professionals taught me that, because of post-Enron
reforms directed toward SPV accounting, the SPV needed to be reflected on the Federal
Reserve‘s balance sheet. And we have followed that professional advice.‖).
62. The composition of the Fed‘s balance sheet has been altered significantly by the
actions that the Fed took during the crisis. As of November 4, 2010, the Fed‘s total assets
stood at $2.3 trillion. Of these assets, 46% were mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and
37% were Treasury securities. Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Factors Affecting
Reserve Balances of Depository Institutions and Condition Statement of Federal Reserve
Banks
(November
4,
2010),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/H41/20101104. This can be contrasted with the
position at the beginning of 2008. At that time, the Fed had total assets of $926 billion. Of
these assets, 80% were Treasury securities. The Fed held no mortgage-backed securities.
Federal Reserve Statistical Release, Factors Affecting Reserve Balances of Depository
Institutions and Condition Statement of Federal Reserve Banks (January 3, 2008), available
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/H41/20080103.
It should be emphasized that the vast majority of the Fed‘s mortgage-backed securities
were purchased under its Mortgage-Backed Securities Purchase Program. This was
established pursuant to Federal Reserve Act § 14(b), which, as we shall see below, permits
the Fed to purchase and sell Treasury and agency securities. Fed. Res. Bank of NY,
Frequently Asked Questions: MBS Purchase Program (Feb. 17, 2010),
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/mbs_faq_100217.html. The Fed used this program to
purchase MBS issued or guaranteed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae. Id. It
purchased $1.25 trillion of these securities between January 2009 and March 2010. Id.
The Fed‘s authority to purchase governmental securities under Federal Reserve Act §
14(b) is beyond doubt. However, as we shall see below, the Fed also purchased securities
issued and backed only by private parties by using § 13(3). See infra Part IV.A.1.ii. It is
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The Fed created SPVs in four cases. First, it provided assistance to
JPMorgan Chase (―JPMorgan‖) in its purchase of Bear Stearns. Second, it
purchased commercial paper from issuers under the Commercial Paper
Funding Facility (CPFF). Third, it purchased money market instruments
from money market mutual funds (MMMFs) under the Money Market
Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF). Finally, it provided assistance to
American International Group (AIG). Once the Fed had created SPVs for
these purposes, it lent money to them using § 13(3). The SPVs in turn
purchased assets from the troubled institutions. These assets served as
collateral for the Fed‘s loans to the SPVs.
There are three reasons why this transactional structure exceeded the
scope of the Fed‘s § 13(3) authority. The first is the loan/asset-purchase
distinction. The second is the requirement of a loan to the party that needs
assistance. And the third is the discount/advance distinction. We will
develop these points with reference to the case of Bear Stearns and
JPMorgan. We will then apply them to subsequent transactions that used
the same structure.
There is one additional concern: whether the loans were in fact
secured to the satisfaction of the Fed at the time it made them. However,
this point lies beyond the scope of this analysis. This is so primarily
because of the difficulties of valuing collateral. Hence we shall assume
below, unless there is a clear indication otherwise, that loans that were
secured were backed by sufficient collateral.
1.

Bear Stearns and JPMorgan

i. Background
Bear Stearns was an investment bank. Because it lacked deposits, it
was dependent on the securities repurchase market for its credit. Many of
its investments were in mortgage-backed securities (MBS).63 In March
2008, Bear Stearns started to experience severe difficulties in obtaining
credit. Its lenders declined to extend the terms of their existing loans, or
refused to make new loans.64 Between March 10 and March 13, 2008, its
cash reserves fell from $18 billion to $2 billion.65

this exercise of legal authority that raises the most important concerns.
63. S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, & URBAN AFFAIRS, 109TH CONG., REP. PURSUANT
TO SECTION 129 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: BRIDGE LOAN
TO THE BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES, INC. THROUGH JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., 1,
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129bearstearnsbridgeloan.pdf.
64. Id. at 2-3.
65. DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRUST: BEN BERNANKE‘S WAR ON THE GREAT PANIC
153–54 (Crown Publishing Group 2009).
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The Fed made an overnight loan to Bear Stearns on March 14, 2008.66
The purpose of this loan was to enable Bear Stearns to meet its immediate
obligations in the securities repurchase market and to prevent its
bankruptcy so that it could explore alternatives.
However, even after this emergency loan, Bear Stearns‘s cash reserves
and stock price continued to decrease.67 JPMorgan emerged as a potential
purchaser of the company. However, it did not wish to acquire all of Bear
Stearns‘s assets. In particular, it sought to avoid purchasing Bear Stearns‘s
illiquid MBS. So on March 16, 2008, two days after its first loan to Bear
Stearns, the Fed agreed to acquire these assets.68
To achieve this goal, the Fed created an SPV. This was a limited
liability company called Maiden Lane. The Fed authorized the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York (the ―New York FRB‖) to lend up to $30
billion to Maiden Lane.69 Maiden Lane would use this money to purchase
Bear Stearns‘s illiquid assets, which would serve as collateral for the New
66. S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, & URBAN AFFAIRS, 109TH CONG., REPORT
PURSUANT TO SECTION 129 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008:
BRIDGE LOAN TO THE BEAR STEARNS COMPANIES, INC. THROUGH JPMORGAN CHASE BANK,
N.A.
1,
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129bearstearnsbridgeloan.pdf.
The transaction took place in two stages. First, the New York Federal Reserve Bank
lent $12.9 billion to JPMorgan at the discount window. Id. at 3. This loan was made
without recourse. Second, JPMorgan lent the same amount to Bear Stearns. In each case,
$13.8 billion of Bear Stearns‘ assets provided collateral for the loan. Id. JPMorgan‘s loan
to Bear Stearns was secured by these assets, and so was the New York FRB‘s loan to
JPMorgan.
To make this loan, the Fed invoked Federal Reserve Act § 11(r). It did so because
one of the Governors, Frederic Mishkin, was abroad and could not be contacted, leaving
only four others to approve the decision. The Fed. Res., Minutes of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System 3 (Mar. 14, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/other20080627a1.pdf. As required
by this provision, the Fed found that the loan to Bear Stearns was necessary to prevent
serious harm to financial stability. S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, & URBAN AFFAIRS,
supra at 3. In support of its findings, the Fed cited the fragile condition of the financial
markets, the prominent position of Bear Stearns in those markets, and the expected
―contagion‖ that would result from its failure. Id. at 2. In a later report, the Fed expanded
on its reasoning. Bear Stearns was a ―major borrower and lender in the repurchase
agreement market.‖ Id. Its failure would have resulted in a significant drop in the
availability of short-term financing, and possibly in threats to the solvency of other large
and highly leveraged financial institutions. Id. at 3.
67. WESSEL, supra note 65, at 166.
68. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., PERIODIC REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION
129(B) OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: UPDATE ON
OUTSTANDING LENDING FACILITIES AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD UNDER SECTION 13(3) OF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE ACT 5 (2009).
69. FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., MAIDEN LANE LLC: A SPECIAL-PURPOSE VEHICLE
CONSOLIDATED BY THE FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. 7 (2009), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/annual/annual08/MaidenLanefinstmt2009.pdf.
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York FRB‘s loan.70
In turn, JPMorgan agreed to lend $1 billion to Maiden Lane.71 Its loan
was made subordinate to the New York FRB‘s loan.72 In this way,
JPMorgan would bear the first $1 billion of any losses among the illiquid
assets that Maiden Lane had purchased. The Fed would bear any
remaining losses. JPMorgan also agreed to guarantee Bear Stearns‘s
ongoing trading obligations between signing and closing.73
ii.

Assessment

We will now set out in greater detail the three reasons why this
transactional structure exceeded the scope of the Fed‘s § 13(3) authority.
The first point concerns the loan/asset-purchase distinction. We argued
above that at the time the Fed used § 13(3), the language of the statute
contemplated a loan transaction, not an asset purchase. This transaction
was a loan, but only in form. The Fed extended credit to Maiden Lane so
that Maiden Lane could purchase Bear Stearns‘s illiquid assets. The
primary goal of the transaction was to remove these assets from Bear
Stearns‘s balance sheet, and so facilitate its acquisition by JPMorgan.
By way of comparison, Reserve Banks do have the authority to
purchase and sell certain assets in their open-market operations. FRA § 14
expressly grants this power to Reserve Banks. However, the power is
limited in scope. Reserve Banks can purchase and sell only a defined list
of assets, including Treasury and agency securities. Securities issued and
backed by corporations do not appear on this list.74 Hence the Fed used §
70. Id. According to Maiden Lane‘s financial statements for the year ending 2008, the
Bear Stearns assets consisted largely of mortgage-related securities, whole mortgages loans,
a total return swap with JPMorgan, and certain mortgage commitments. Id.
71. Id. at 12.
72. Id.
73. Press Release, JPMorgan Chase and Bear Stearns Announce Amended Agreement
(Mar.
24,
2008),
http://www.jpmorgan.com/cm/cs?pagename=JPM_redesign/JPM_Content_C/Generic_Detai
l_Page_Template&cid=1159339104093&c=JPM_Content_C (setting out the key terms of
the amended merger agreement). JPMorgan agreed to pay a higher price per share: $10
rather than $2. Id. When the loan closed on June 26, 2008, there had been adjustments in
the values of the assets that Maiden Lane had purchased from Bear Stearns. Overall, the
New York FRB lent Maiden Lane $28.8 billion, and JPMorgan lent Maiden Lane $1.1
billion. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., PERIODIC REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION
129(B) OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: UPDATE ON
OUTSTANDING LENDING FACILITIES AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD UNDER SECTION 13(3) OF
THE
FEDERAL
RESERVE
ACT
9
(2009),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129periodicupdate02252009.pdf.
74. Federal Reserve Act § 14, 12 U.S.C. §§ 353-359 (2006). In full, the assets eligible
for purchase by the Fed under Federal Reserve Act § 14 are: gold (§ 14(a)), debt issued or
guaranteed by the US government or its agencies (§ 14(b)(1)), debt issued by state, local and
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13(3), a provision that then made no reference to the Fed‘s ability to buy
and sell, to effect the purchase of privately issued securities in a transaction
that would have been impermissible under § 14 itself. It is difficult to see
how the Fed‘s loan-making power under § 13(3) could have encompassed
such a purchase.75
The second point concerns the requirement of a loan to the party that
needs assistance. We argued above that § 13(3) required that the borrower
be the same party that had difficulty obtaining credit from elsewhere: the
foreign governments (§ 14(b)(1)), and three kinds of private debt. Id. The first two are
cable transfers (foreign exchange) and bankers‘ acceptances (orders to pay that become
promises to pay after a banker accepts them). Small & Clouse, supra note 7, at 26-28.
The Fed may also purchase bills of exchange. From member banks, it may purchase
bills of exchange ―arising out of commercial transactions.‖ Federal Reserve Act § 14(c).
And in the open market, it may purchase bills of exchange ―of the kinds and maturities . . .
made eligible for rediscount‖ by the Federal Reserve Act. Id. at § 14. A bill of exchange is
a three-party instrument in which A orders that B make a payment to C. See supra Part II.B.
In ordinary circumstances, then, the Fed may purchase bills of exchange as set out in
Federal Reserve Act § 13(4) (demand bills of exchange relating to the domestic shipment of
agricultural goods), § 13(6) (acceptances relating to the shipment of goods and acceptances
to create dollar exchanges), and § 13(2) (bills of exchange secured by agricultural paper).
The Fed may also purchase bills of exchange eligible for discount under § 13(2) (those
issued or drawn for agricultural, industrial, or commercial purposes – or that have proceeds
that will be used for such purposes – with a maximum maturity period of ninety days). See
supra note 10 (setting out instruments eligible for discount at the discount window); Small
& Clouse, supra note 7, at 34 (setting out assets eligible for purchase in the open-market). It
is possible to argue that § 13(3) expands the range of bills of exchange that the Fed can
purchase under § 14. This is because § 13(3) is a provision under which these instruments
are ―made eligible for rediscount,‖ as required by § 14. In this way, Small and Clouse
suggest that in ―unusual and exigent circumstances,‖ the Fed may be able to purchase bills
of exchange that are endorsed or secured as required by § 13(3). Id. at 30-31. However,
they note that the point remains unsettled. Id.
We can make two further points in connection with this analysis. The first is that the
Fed did not invoke § 14 when it set up any of its SPV transactions. It made reference to §
13(3) alone. As such, it did not resolve the question whether § 13(3) extends the range of
bills of exchange that are eligible for purchase under § 14. The second point is that
corporate securities are not bills of exchange. And commercial paper is not a banker‘s
acceptance. Hence the Fed‘s purchases of mortgage-backed securities and collateralized
debt obligations from Bear Stearns and AIG would not have come within the scope of § 14.
See infra Part IV.A.4. Neither, in turn, would its purchases of commercial paper and
money-market instruments under the CPFF and the MMIFF. See infra Parts IV.A.2-3.
75. There is a possible counter-argument. I am grateful to Professor Howell Jackson
for raising it with me. The argument is that a non-recourse loan on which the borrower
defaults has the same effect as an asset-purchase. To illustrate this, let us suppose that
instead of using the SPV structure, the Fed had made a large non-recourse loan to JPMorgan
to facilitate its acquisition of Bear Stearns. If JPMorgan decided to default on the loan, the
Fed would be left with an interest in the collateral, which it would then sell in an attempt to
recoup its losses. The outcome in this scenario is the same as that in the purchase
transaction. However, as we pointed out supra note 12, these transactions are analytically
distinct. Once more, in a loan transaction, the bank‘s goal at the outset is to lend money
against the borrower‘s collateral, not to acquire it.
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loan had to be made to such individual, partnership, or corporation.76
On the present facts, Maiden Lane was the borrower. Bear Stearns, on
the other hand, was the party unable to secure credit from elsewhere. We
can say that Bear Stearns was the beneficiary of the New York FRB‘s loan
transaction, because it was able to sell various illiquid assets.77 Even so,
one party received a loan, and a different party had difficulty obtaining
credit.78
A response to this argument would be to say that our focus on the
word ―such‖ may be textually correct, but that it may result in
inefficiencies. It requires that the Fed make loans only directly to the party
that requires them. A court interpreting the statute might instead have
concluded that there were strong arguments in favor of the Fed‘s being able
to make loans indirectly through another entity. For example, the Fed may
have wished, for reasons of transactional efficiency, to create one company
through which it could make loans to a series of other companies. For this
reason, a court might have read the language of the statute broadly, so that
such individual referred not only to the immediate borrower but also to the
beneficiary: the ultimate borrower.
Even so, on the present facts, it is difficult to see where the Fed
achieved any increase in transactional efficiency. It made a loan to only
one beneficiary. The more persuasive view must instead be that the Fed
incorporated the SPV so that it could fit its transaction within the loan form
and so effect the asset purchase that we criticized above.

76. See supra Part II.D.
77. Or perhaps this was JPMorgan, because it was able to buy Bear Stearns.
Regardless, the analysis stands unchanged.
78. The Fed‘s minutes of March 16, 2008 do make reference to the statutory
requirement of a loan to the party that needs assistance. See The Fed. Res., Minutes of the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2 (Mar. 16, 2008), available at
http://federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/other20080627a2.pdf (stating that the Fed
authorized the New York FRB to ―make a nonrecourse loan of up to $30 billion . . . if [the
New York FRB] found that adequate credit accommodations were not available to the
borrower from other banking sources‖) (emphasis added). However, the Fed did not go on
to consider the question whether it was indeed lending to a borrower that found itself in this
position.
There remains a counter-argument: that Maiden Lane was itself unable to secure
adequate credit from other banking institutions. The steps in this argument are as follows.
At the moment of its incorporation, Maiden Lane had no assets. It had one sole purpose: to
purchase certain assets from Bear Stearns. It is difficult to see why anyone other than its
parent would lend to such a company. Any other lender might refuse to make a loan
because it would be plain to that lender that the Fed would shortly make a loan to its own
SPV. This argument seems strained. However, if it is correct, then the Fed will be able to
avoid the requirement of a borrower‘s being unable to secure credit every time it places an
SPV between itself and the beneficiary of the transaction. And so it seems likely that the
courts would reject this analysis because, ex hypothesi, it negates one of the conditions of
the statute.
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The third point concerns the discount/advance distinction. It can be
argued that in this transaction, there was no discount within the meaning of
§ 13(3). We saw above that discounting involves lending against a
financial instrument at a discount from the face value of that instrument. It
follows that the borrower must have existing assets to begin with, before it
receives any loan. However, in the present transaction, Maiden Lane did
not have any assets at the time of its incorporation. Instead, it used the
Fed‘s loan to purchase Bear Stearns‘ securities. Only after this purchase
was it able to provide any collateral for the Fed‘s transaction. A loan
secured by the borrower‘s own pledge of future payment is an advance, not
a discount.79
However, this concern could perhaps have been resolved. If Bear
Stearns‘s assets had been transferred to Maiden Lane first, before the Fed
extended credit against them, then the statutory requirement of a discount
may have been met.
2.

The Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF)

We will now go on to apply these and other arguments to another case
in which the Fed effected an asset purchase: that of the CPFF. An
additional point to reemphasize at this stage is that, as we have seen, §
13(3) requires financial instruments against which loans are to be made to
be endorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the Reserve Bank.
This is the requirement of endorsement or security.

79. When a Reserve Bank makes an advance at its discount window, it extends credit in
exchange for the borrower‘s own promissory note. Ordinarily, the borrower must also
provide some security for its promise to pay. See Federal Reserve Act § 13(8), 12 U.S.C. §
347 (2006) (stating that Reserve Banks can make ninety-day advances to individual member
banks on notes that are secured by such financial instruments as are eligible for discount or
purchase under the other provisions of the FRA); § 10B (stating that Reserve Banks can
make advances to individual member banks on their time or demand notes where such notes
are secured to the satisfaction of the Reserve Bank); § 10A (stating that Reserve Banks can
make advances to groups of member banks on their unsecured demand notes, provided they
have no assets available for discounting); § 13(13) (stating Reserve Banks can make
advances to any individual, partnership, or corporation on notes that are secured by Treasury
or agency securities). See also supra note 10 and accompanying notes; Regulation A, 12
C.F.R. § 201.4(d) (2001) (explaining that, in accordance with § 13(13) FRA, Reserve Banks
can make advances to nonbanks only against Treasury or agency securities).
Advances are made more often than discounts. See Gordon & Muller, supra note 20,
at 29 n.100 (―In general loans made to depository banks through the discount window have
been in the form of ‗advances,‘ evidenced by a promissory note from the borrower, on the
security of the borrower, rather than a ‗discount‘ on third-party indebtedness pledged by the
borrower. This is because the loan transaction is straight-forward and the collateral
requirements are looser.‖).
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Background

Commercial paper is short-term, high-quality debt issued by
corporations. In the days following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers
(which will be considered below),80 the market for new issuances of
commercial paper began to decline.
Money market mutual funds (MMMFs) and other investors became
reluctant to invest in commercial paper.81 Those that continued to invest
did so at high interest rates and on a short-term basis, such as overnight.82
As a result, many corporations had to make payments on their maturing
commercial paper by issuing new paper (thereby ―rolling over‖ their
paper). To meet the credit needs of these corporations in the longer term,
the Fed created the CPFF on October 7, 2008.83
The CPFF, which expired on February 1, 2010, purchased newly
issued commercial paper from corporate issuers.84 It purchased both assetbacked and unsecured commercial paper.85 To create this program, the Fed
incorporated an SPV: the Commercial Paper Funding Facility LLC. It
made a series of loans to the SPV, via the New York FRB.86
Certain fees were also applicable. Each issuer had to pay a fee in
order to use the CPFF.87 Furthermore, issuers of unsecured paper had to
pay a ―credit enhancement fee‖ of 100 basis points before the SPV would
purchase their paper.88 These fees were intended to provide the SPV with
some protection against losses.

80. See infra Part IV.C.
81. Press Release, Bd. Of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Board Announces Creation
of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) to Help Provide Liquidity to Term
Funding
Markets
(Oct.
7,
2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081007c.htm.
82. Id.
83. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Commercial Paper Funding Facility: Frequently Asked
Questions (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/cpff_faq.html [hereinafter
Commercial Paper Funding Facility].
84. Id. In fact, primary dealers acted as intermediaries between the Fed‘s SPV and the
issuers. Id.
85. Asset-backed commercial paper is commercial paper secured by an underlying
asset. Unsecured commercial paper, on the other hand, is backed by the issuer‘s bare
promise to pay.
86. Commercial Paper Funding Facility, supra note 83.
87. Id.
88. FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y., COMMERCIAL PAPER FUNDING FACILITY LLC, A SPECIALPURPOSE VEHICLE CONSOLIDATED BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK,
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE PERIOD OCTOBER 14, 2008 TO DECEMBER 31, 2008, AND
INDEPENDENT
AUDITORS‘
REPORT
10
(2009),
available
at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/annual/annual08/CPFFfinstmt2009.pdf.
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ii.

Assessment

Once more, it will be argued that this transactional structure went
beyond the scope of the Fed‘s § 13(3) authority. It is closely analogous to
the structure used in the Bear Stearns-JPMorgan transaction. The Fed
created an SPV, then extended loans to it that were to be used for the
purchase of certain assets. However, an important difference in this case is
that the assets to be purchased were unsecured as well as asset-backed.
Two of the arguments made above are once more applicable in the
present case. First, there remains a concern about the loan/asset-purchase
distinction. Again, this SPV effected asset purchases rather than loans.
Second, there is also a concern about the requirement of a loan to the party
that needs assistance. Here, the borrower (the SPV) was not the same
party as that which had difficulty obtaining credit from elsewhere (the
issuer of commercial paper).
The discount/advance distinction does not seem to be a concern here
because, as we have seen, issuers had to pay fees in order to use the CPFF.
Hence the SPV did have some existing assets with which to collateralize its
loans from the Fed. However, there is a further concern in the context of
this transaction: that the requirement of endorsement or security was not
met. By purchasing unsecured commercial paper under the CPFF, the Fed
went against the statutory requirement that financial instruments being
discounted must be endorsed or secured.
It may be argued in response that the Fed enjoys some measure of
discretion in this area: a loan need only be secured to the satisfaction of the
Reserve Bank. However, as concluded above, the most persuasive reading
of the statute looks at the need for some security.89 An issuer‘s promise to
pay provides no such security.
There is a counter-argument: that the Fed secured its loans by
imposing fees on issuers who sold their commercial paper to the CPFF.
We saw above that issuers of unsecured commercial paper had to pay a
surcharge of 100 basis points before their paper would be eligible for
purchase. Even if we include the registration fees collected from all
participants, the total amount of collateral was fractional at best.
Nevertheless, it remains possible to argue that by collecting these fees, the
Fed secured its loans to its own satisfaction.
3.

The Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF)

i. Background
Money market mutual funds (MMMFs) are financial institutions that
89. See supra Part II.F.
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invest in high-quality debt instruments, such as Treasury bills and
commercial paper.90 They issue shares to their investors that can be
redeemed for cash. Because they invest in low-risk instruments, they are
ordinarily able to maintain a stable net asset value of $1 per share.
The Reserve Primary Fund is one such fund. It had invested $785
million (1.2% of its total assets) in Lehman‘s commercial paper. Once
Lehman filed for bankruptcy, the fund was unable to meet the cumulative
requests for redemptions. It therefore suspended these requests, and it also
began to sell off its asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). On
September 16, 2008, it cut the price of its shares to 97 cents per share,
thereby ‗breaking the buck‘ and setting in motion a run on money markets.
In response, on September 19, 2008, the Fed created the Asset-Backed
Commercial Paper Money Market Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF) (which
we shall examine below when we come to consider loan transactions).91
This facility made loans to depository institutions that would purchase
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) from money market mutual funds
(MMMFs).
However, the AMLF was not the Fed‘s only response to the
difficulties faced by MMMFs. Later, on October 21, 2008, it also created
the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF). This facility was
intended to purchase money-market instruments from MMMFs, including
commercial paper, certificates of deposit, and bank notes. However, no
purchases were ever made under the program, which expired on February
1, 2010.92
To create it, the Fed incorporated a series of SPVs. It planned to make
loans to them via the New York FRB. The SPVs would purchase money
market instruments for 90% of their value in cash.93 To cover the
remaining 10%, they would issue subordinated ABCP to the MMMFs. In
this way, the MMMFs would absorb the first 10% of losses.
ii.

Assessment

For reasons similar to those given above, it will be argued that this
90. Money market mutual funds emerged in the 1970s in response to Regulation Q,
which permitted the Fed to limit interest rates on demand deposits. Because money market
mutual funds issue demand equity, they came outside the scope of this Regulation. It was
phased out in 1982. CARNELL, ET AL., supra note 7, at 23-25.
91. See infra Part IV.B.3.
92. BAIRD WEBEL & MARC LABONTE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS IN RESPONSE TO FINANCIAL TURMOIL REPORT 22 (Feb. 1,
2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41073.pdf.
93. THE FED. RES., REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 129 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC
STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: MONEY MARKET INVESTOR FUNDING FACILITY 2 (2008),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129mmiff.pdf.
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transactional structure went beyond the scope of the Fed‘s § 13(3)
authority. First, the transaction did not observe the loan/asset-purchase
distinction. Second, there was no loan to the party that needs assistance.
Third, it seems that the requirement of endorsement or security was not
met. This is so if we assume that the facility purchased unsecured as well
as secured commercial paper. Its terms do not address this point.94
Finally, it is also possible that the discount/advance distinction would
not have been met. There is no indication that MMMFs had to pay fees to
use this program. If they did not, then the SPVs would not, before making
purchases, have had any assets with which to collateralize their loans from
the Fed.
4.

AIG

Above, we considered transactions that effected asset purchases. The
case of AIG is a hybrid case insofar as it involved both asset purchases and
loans. We will argue that only the loan elements of this transaction came
within the scope of the Fed‘s statutory authority.
i.

Background

AIG is a large holding company. Its primary business is the provision
of insurance.95
It does this through a number of state-regulated
subsidiaries.96 It also has a financial services business.97 This subsidiary,
AIG Financial Products (AIGFP), was counterparty to a number of credit
default swaps (CDS) (contracts that transfer the risk of default from a party
purchasing protection to a party providing it).98 By writing such swaps,
AIGFP provided protection to a number of entities, such as financial
institutions, pension funds, and municipalities.99
AIG had been operating a securities lending program under which it
lent out securities held by its life insurance subsidiaries in exchange for
94. The terms of the facility do not indicate whether it was restricted to secured paper.
Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Money Market Investor Funding Facility: Program Terms and
Conditions (June 25, 2009), http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/mmiff_terms.html.
However, Scott suggests that unsecured paper was eligible for purchase. See HAL S. SCOTT,
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS (Foundation Press 2009) at 28 (―[T]he actual assets of the
SPV [were] generally uncollateralized.‖).
95. U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, STATUS OF
GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE PROVIDED TO AIG 4 (Sept. 2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09975.pdf.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 8.
99. SCOTT, supra note 94, at 42-45. By the end of 2008, the size of AIG‘s CDS
portfolio was $527 billion. Id. at 43.

246

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 13:1

cash.100 AIG used these funds to purchase other securities, such as MBS.101
When the value of these securities declined, AIG was obliged to post
additional collateral for its counterparties.102 Furthermore, when credit
rating agencies downgraded their ratings on AIG in May 2008, it was again
obliged to post additional collateral under the terms of its CDS
agreements.103 AIG suffered a further rating downgrade in September
2008.104 By this stage, a number of counterparties refused to transact with
it, and it faced severe liquidity problems.105
The Fed was concerned that AIG might default on its CDS. In the
Fed‘s view, this would have led to a ―steep decline in confidence in the
global banking system and possibly to the collapse of other major financial
institutions.‖106
a.

Initial structure

On September 16, 2008, the Fed authorized the New York FRB to
lend up to $85 billion to AIG under § 13(3).107 This lending took place
under a two-year revolving credit facility.108 The loan was secured by
pledges of many of the assets of AIG and its subsidiaries (other than its
state- and foreign-regulated subsidiaries).109 As additional compensation to
the government, AIG issued preferred stock in trust for the Treasury.110

100. U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 95, at 8.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 11.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 12.
105. Id. AIG had posted $19.7 billion of collateral by the end of August 2008. Id.
106. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., PERIODIC REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION
129(B) OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: UPDATE ON
OUTSTANDING LENDING FACILITIES AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD UNDER SECTION 13(3) OF
THE
FEDERAL
RESERVE
ACT
11
(2009),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129periodicupdate02252009.pdf.
107. Id.
108. See THE FED. RES., REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 129 OF THE EMERGENCY
ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: SECURITIES BORROWING FACILITY FOR AMERICAN
INTERNATIONAL
GROUP,
INC.
3
(2008),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129aigsecborrowfacility.pdf
(―The
Securities Borrowing Facility has the same maximum duration as the September Facility
(September 16, 2010) in order to allow the company to conduct an orderly disposition of
certain of its assets‖).
109. U.S. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS., & URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORT PURSUANT TO
SECTION 129 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: SECURITIES
BORROWING FACILITY FOR AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC. 5-6 (2008), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/FederalReserveReportonSecuredCreditFacilityAIG.p
df.
110. Id. at 7.

MEHRAFINALIZED_FIVE_UPDATED AFTER PUBLICATION

3/2/2011 8:48 PM

2010]LEGAL AUTHORITY IN UNUSUAL AND EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES 247
This stock was convertible into 79.9% of AIG‘s common stock.111
Next, on October 8, 2008, the Fed provided further funds to AIG
under § 13(3). It authorized the New York FRB to borrow $37.8 billion of
investment-grade securities from AIG under AIG‘s securities lending
program in exchange for cash collateral.112
b.

Revised structure

On November 10, 2008, the Treasury and the Fed together
restructured the Fed‘s investment following the creation of the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP).113 The Treasury purchased $40 billion of
preferred stock in AIG. AIG used these proceeds in part to repay $25
billion of the Fed‘s loans.114 In this way, the size of the Fed‘s credit facility
was reduced from $85 billion to $60 billion.115 Next, the Fed created two
further credit facilities for AIG. These were two new SPVs: Maiden Lane
II and Maiden Lane III LLC.
Maiden Lane II received a $19.5 billion loan from the New York
FRB. It used this loan to purchase AIG‘s residential MBS portfolio.116
AIG used these funds and others of its own to pay back the Fed‘s $37.8
billion loan of October 8, 2008.117 It then terminated its securities lending
program.
Maiden Lane III received a $24.3 billion loan from the New York
FRB.118 It used this loan to purchase from AIG‘s counterparties those

111. Id.
112. See Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Board Authorizes
Federal Reserve Bank of New York to Borrow Securities from certain regulated U.S.
insurance
subsidiaries
of
AIG
(Oct.
8,
2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20081008a.htm
(describing
the
transaction). In effect, though, AIG itself borrowed cash from the Fed and provided
securities as collateral.
113. TARP was created by the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 2008 (―EESA‖).
It made available up to $700 billion of funds. 12 U.S.C. § 5225 (2008). Initially, it was
envisaged that these would be used to purchase troubled assets from financial institutions.
However, the Treasury later decided to make capital investments instead. Press Release,
U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Treasury Announces TARP Capital Purchase Program Description
(Oct. 14, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1207.htm.
114. SCOTT, supra note 94, at 44.
115. The interest rate on this facility was also reduced, from 850 basis points above
three-month LIBOR to 300 basis points above three-month LIBOR. Id. at 44.
116. Fed.
Res.
Bank
of
N.Y.,
Maiden
Lane
Transactions,
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/maidenlane2.html (last visited Sept. 28, 2010)
[hereinafter Maiden Lane Transactions].
117. SCOTT, supra note 94, at 44. Hence, as Scott points out, ―this represented a
restructuring of existing debt rather than an injection of additional funds.‖ Id.
118. Maiden Lane Transactions, supra note 116.
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collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)119 on which AIG had written
CDS.120 As part of these transactions, each counterparty agreed to
terminate its CDS contracts with AIG.121
c.

Re-revised structure

On March 2, 2009, the Treasury and the Fed restructured their
investments once more. The Treasury created a new five-year equity
capital facility, under which AIG could obtain $30 billion of capital in
exchange for newly issued preferred stock.122
The Fed restructured its revolving credit facility. It reduced the size of
this facility from $60 billion to $25 billion.123 In exchange, the Fed
received stock interests in certain of AIG‘s subsidiaries.124 Furthermore,
the Fed authorized the New York FRB under § 13(3) to lend $8.5 billion to
AIG‘s life insurance subsidiaries.125
ii.

Assessment

The above series of transactions can be classified into loan
arrangements and asset purchases. The Fed made certain loans to AIG
under § 13(3). Later, these loans were restructured, such that the Treasury
assumed greater risk. These actions appear to have come within the scope
of the Fed‘s § 13(3) authority. The loans were secured by the assets of
119. CDOs are asset-backed or synthetic securities. These represent interests in a set of
underlying assets or referenced obligations. HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE:
TRANSACTIONS, POLICY AND REGULATION 566–567 (Foundation Press) (2009) [hereinafter
SCOTT II].
120. Maiden Lane Transactions, supra note 116.
121. Id.
122. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., PERIODIC REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION
129(B) OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: UPDATE ON
OUTSTANDING LENDING FACILITIES AUTHORIZED BY THE BOARD UNDER SECTION 13(3) OF
THE
FEDERAL
RESERVE
ACT
8
(2009),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129periodicupdate02252009.pdf. The
Treasury also exchanged its preferred stock for shares with terms that more closely resemble
common equity. Id.
123. U.S. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS., & URBAN AFFAIRS, REPORT PURSUANT TO
SECTION 129 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: RESTRUCTURING
OF THE GOVERNMENT‘S FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO THE AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL GROUP, INC.
6
(2009),
available
at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_files/AIGMarch2009RestructuringReportFinal.pdf.
124. Id. at 9.
125. Id. at 5 (describing the Fed‘s decision to extend credit to AIG and outlining the
terms of the agreement). In more precise terms, the Fed authorized the New York FRB to
make loans to certain SPVs to be established by these subsidiaries. Id. The SPVs would
repay these loans from the net cash flows they received from blocks of life insurance
policies held by the parent insurance companies. Id.
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AIG and its subsidiaries.
In contrast, it appears that the set of transactions effected by Maiden
Lane II and III went beyond the scope of the Fed‘s authority. The primary
concerns once more are the loan/asset-purchase distinction and the
requirement of a loan to the party that needs assistance.
B.

Loan transactions

The transactions in this group resemble more closely the paradigmatic
loans that are contemplated by § 13(3). For the most part, then, it will be
argued that these transactions fell within the scope of the Fed‘s § 13(3)
authority.
However, the remaining concerns are two-fold. The first is whether
the requirement of a loan to the party that needs assistance was met. The
second is whether the Fed did in fact lend against appropriate collateral.
But as we stated above, an examination of the quality of collateral lies
beyond the scope of this analysis. We shall assume once more, unless there
is a clear indication otherwise, that those loans that were secured were
backed by sufficient collateral.
We shall consider four lending facilities.126 The first is the Term
Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), under which the Fed lent out Treasury
securities to primary dealers. The second is the Primary Dealer Credit
Facility (PDCF), under which the Fed provided overnight loans to primary
dealers. The third is the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market
Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF), under which the Fed made loans
126. The Fed also invoked § 13(3) when entering into certain arrangements with
Citigroup and Bank of America pursuant to the Treasury‘s Asset Guarantee Program. BD.
OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RES. SYS., REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 129 OF THE
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: AUTHORIZATION TO PROVIDE RESIDUAL
FINANCING TO CITIGROUP, INC. FOR A DESIGNATED ASSET POOL (2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129citigroup.pdf; BD. OF GOVERNORS
OF THE FED. RES. SYS., REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 129 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC
STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: AUTHORIZATION TO PROVIDE RESIDUAL FINANCING TO BANK OF
AMERICA CORPORATION RELATING TO A DESIGNATED ASSET POOL (2009), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129bofa.pdf. Under this program, the
Treasury and the FDIC agreed to bear a portion of any losses in designated pools of assets
held by these two financial institutions. On November 23, 2008 and January 15, 2009, the
Fed authorized its Reserve Banks to make § 13(3) loans to Citigroup and Bank of America,
respectively, in the event that they incurred losses in amounts greater than those agreed to be
borne by the Treasury and the FDIC. Id. The Fed made no loans under these programs,
which have since been terminated. Id.; Road to Stability, Asset Guarantee Program,
FINANCIALSTABILITY.GOV,
http://www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/assetguaranteeprogram.htm (last updated
Oct. 3, 2010). Had any loans been made, it seems the only § 13(3) concerns raised thereby
would have been as to the kinds of instruments eligible for discount, because corporate
shares were not expressly excluded from the scope of the arrangements. See supra Part II.B.
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to banks and other financial institutions that purchased commercial paper.
Finally, we shall consider the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility
(TALF), under which the Fed made loans to investors that were used to
purchase asset-backed securities.
1.

The Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF)

i. Background
Primary dealers are large financial institutions that trade directly with
the Fed.127 They purchase and sell Treasury and other securities on its
behalf, and so help it conduct its open-market operations.128 Unlike
commercial banks, primary dealers (and securities dealers more generally)
do not have a base of deposits with which to finance their operations.129
Instead, they borrow funds in the credit markets. Much of their borrowing
takes place in the securities repurchase market.130
In this market, primary dealers enter into repurchase agreements, the
effect of which is to allow them to borrow funds against their own
securities. These transactions are structured as purchases. A dealer sells a
security to a lender, and agrees to repurchase it at a fixed price on a
specified date.131 The lender has possession of the security until the dealer
repurchases it. The lender is entitled to sell it in the event that the dealer
defaults. It has further protection in the form of the haircut that it applies to
the value of the collateral.
Repurchase agreements help to ensure the efficient allocation of
capital in financial markets. For dealers, they are a source of funds for
transactional activities. For lenders, they are a relatively safe way of
lending out surplus funds for a short term: typically overnight, but perhaps
for up to two weeks.
By March 2008, lenders had become reluctant to enter into these
agreements. They were concerned about the solvency of borrowers, as well

127. Fed.
Res.
Bank
of
N.Y.,
Primary
Dealers
(Sept.
2008),
http://www.ny.frb.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed02.html.
128. Id.
129. Tobias Adrian et al., The Federal Reserve’s Primary Dealer Credit Facility, 15
CURRENT ISSUES IN ECO. AND FIN. 1, 5 (Aug. 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1473444 (explaining that ―[w]hile
traditional commercial banks hold nontradable bank loans on the asset side of their balance
sheets and nontradable deposits on the liability side, dealers hold tradable securities on the
asset side.‖).
130. At the end of 2007, repurchase transactions made up 38% of broker-dealers‘ total
liabilities. Id. at 2.
131. Most repurchase agreements (including the Fed‘s) are actually structured as triparty
agreements. The third party is a clearing bank, at which the borrower posts collateral and
receives funds. Id.
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as the value of the securities pledged as collateral.132 MBS were perceived
as particularly risky.133 A number of lenders chose to lend only against the
safest securities, such as Treasury securities.134 Those lenders that
continued to lend against riskier securities applied sharp haircuts.135
In response, on March 11, 2008, the Fed created the TSLF. This
facility, which expired on February 1, 2010,136 lent out Treasury securities
to primary dealers, who provided their own securities (including MBS) as
collateral.137 The New York FRB was authorized to lend out a total of $200
billion of Treasury securities.138 These loans were allocated by weekly
auction.139
The program was not designed to be a long-term response to liquidity
problems in the credit markets. Each loan had a maturity of twenty-eight
days.140 Furthermore, loans were made with recourse, so that dealers were
obliged to repay the Fed for any decline in the value of the collateral that
they had pledged.141
ii.

Assessment

The TSLF appears to have come within the scope of the Fed‘s § 13(3)
authority. This facility made a series of loans to primary dealers that were
collateralized by their debt securities.142 This transactional structure seems
to fulfill the requirements set out in § 13(3).143
2.

The Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF)

i. Background
Even after the Fed had averted the collapse of Bear Stearns, other
primary dealers still faced their own difficulties obtaining credit in the
repurchase markets. And so on March 16, 2008 (the same day on which
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Term Securities Lending Facility: Program Terms and
Conditions (June 25, 2009), http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/tslf_terms.html.
137. Id.
138. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., FOMC Statement: Federal
Reserve and Other Central Banks Announce Specific Measures Designed to Address
Liquidity
Pressures
in
Funding
Markets
(Mar.
11,
2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080311a.htm.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. WESSEL, supra note 65, at 152.
142. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., supra note 136.
143. See supra Part II.B.
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the Fed provided funds for the Bear Stearns acquisition), the Fed opened a
new lending facility for primary dealers: the Primary Dealer Credit Facility
(PDCF).
The PDCF, which expired on February 1, 2010,144 provided secured
overnight loans to primary dealers.145 It was analogous to the existing
discount window program for banks. However, there were two important
differences. First, discount window loans had a longer maturity period, of
up to ninety days. Second, a broader range of collateral was eligible to be
pledged at the PDCF than at the discount window: all collateral eligible for
pledge in triparty repurchase agreements with the Fed.146 A haircut was
applied to this collateral.
ii.

Assessment

Initially, it appears that the PDCF came within the scope of the Fed‘s
§ 13(3) authority. As at the TSLF, the Fed made a series of secured loans
to primary dealers (but of cash rather than of Treasury securities).
However, the PDCF did not restrict instruments eligible for discount to
credit instruments.147 And as we saw above, corporate shares do not appear
in the enumerated list of instruments eligible for discount.148
3.

The ABCP Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility
(AMLF)

i. Background
We saw above that MMMFs faced difficulties in September 2008,
once Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy and the Reserve Primary Fund
144. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Federal Reserve Announces
Two Initiatives Designed to Bolster Market Liquidity and Promote Orderly Market
Functioning
(Mar.
16,
2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080316a.htm.
145. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Primary Dealer Credit Facility: Program Terms and
Conditions (June 25, 2009), http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pdcf_terms.html.
146. Id. The Fed expanded the group of eligible securities on September 14. Previously,
the range of eligible collateral had included only investment-grade equities and securities (as
well as collateral that could be pledged in the Fed‘s open-market operations). See Press
Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Federal Reserve Board Announces Several
Initiatives to Provide Additional Support to Financial Markets, Including Enhancements to
its
Existing
Liquidity
Facilities
(Sept.
14,
2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20080914a.htm (announcing this
change).
147. Fed. Red. Bank of N.Y., Primary Dealer Credit Facility: Program Terms and
Conditions (June 25, 2009), http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/pdcf_terms.html (stating that
eligible collateral at the PDCF included ―all collateral eligible for pledge in triparty funding
arrangements through the major clearing banks‖ which encompasses equity as well as debt).
148. See supra Part II.B.
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―broke the buck‖.149 In response, on September 19, 2008,150 the Fed created
the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund
Liquidity Facility (AMLF) (and later, it also created the MMIFF, which we
examined above).151
The AMLF, which expired on February 1, 2010, sought to prevent
other MMMFs from selling their asset-backed commercial paper in a
falling market. By doing so, they were increasing the demand for
redemptions and heightening their liquidity problems. The AMLF made
non-recourse loans to depository institutions and bank holding companies.
These loans were used to purchase ABCP from MMMFs that were
experiencing significant demands for redemption.152 The collateral for the
loans was the purchased ABCP.153
ii.

Assessment

Initially, this structure appears to be similar to that involved in the
Bear Stearns-JPMorgan transaction. The Fed made a loan to an entity that
used it to purchase assets. These assets constituted the security for the
loan. Even so, we will conclude that this transaction actually came within
the scope of the Fed‘s § 13(3) authority. Why would this be the case?
The answer is that here, there was no impermissible asset purchase by
the Fed, or by an SPV controlled by the Fed. Instead, the purchased ABCP
was brought onto the balance sheets of the depository institutions rather
than onto the balance sheet of a Fed-created entity.154
In this way, the Fed did not exceed the bounds of its § 13(3) powers.
It made loans to depository institutions. They then purchased assets, which
appeared on their own balance sheets. Section 13(3) contemplates a loan
transaction. It does not then constrain what the borrower goes on to do
with that loan.155 Overall, then, the loan/asset-purchase distinction was
149. See supra Part IV.A.3.i.
150. THE FED. RES., REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 129 OF THE EMERGENCY ECONOMIC
STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: ASSET-BACKED COMMERCIAL PAPER MONEY MARKET MUTUAL
FUND
LIQUIDITY
FACILITY
1
(2008),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/files/129amlf.pdf
(describing
the
background, structure, and basic terms of the AMLF).
151. Id.
152. Id. MMMFs eligible to participate had to have experienced outflows of at least 5
percent of net assets in a single day or at least 10 per cent of assets within the previous five
business days.
153. Id. at 3. Eligible ABCP had to be purchased after September 19, 2008. Id. It had
to be issued by a U.S. entity, and to receive a high rating from a credit-rating agency. Id.
The maturity of the ABCP could not exceed 120 days (if banks were purchasing it) or 270
days (if nonbanks were purchasing it). Id.
154. Cf. Baxter, supra note 19, at 13 (describing purchases by the Fed‘s own SPVs).
155. Assuming that the borrower is not the Fed, which (as we have argued above) has the
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met in this case.
Is this analysis persuasive? One could argue in response that there is
no difference in substance between the AMLF and the Bear StearnsJPMorgan transaction. Maiden Lane is a distinct corporate entity. It is just
as separate from the Fed as are the financial institutions that borrowed
under the AMLF. But the counter-argument is that the Fed manages and
controls Maiden Lane‘s assets. In contrast, it has no control over the assets
of the financial institutions that received loans under the AMLF.
On the present facts, then, the Fed did not itself purchase ABCP from
MMMFs in order to move this paper onto its own balance sheet and so
make the purchase of an MMMF a more attractive prospect for another
private party. It made loans to financial institutions, so that they
themselves could purchase ABCP and hence provide liquidity to MMMFs
facing redemption.
Even so, there remains a concern about a loan to the party that needs
assistance. The borrowers (the depository institutions) were not the parties
that were unable to receive credit from elsewhere (the MMMFs).156
4.

The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF)

i. Background
Securitization is a process by means of which entities can more easily
transfer loans away from their balance sheets.157 First, they create pools of
these loans. Next, they sell interests in these pools to investors. The
interests take the form of securities. This process can be advantageous for
banks because they may then be able to originate further loans.
Furthermore, investors in the securities may benefit from diversification
because of their interests in a large underlying pool of assets.
Asset-backed securities (ABS) derive value from their underlying
assets. Examples of ABS include securities created from automobile loans,
credit card loans, and leases of equipment (but not, by convention,
mortgage-backed securities, which are referred to separately as MBS).158
In October 2008, new issues of ABS came to a halt. The Fed was
concerned because, as it pointed out, ABS markets ―historically have
specific statutory power under § 13(3) to make secured loans, and not to purchase assets.
156. It is possible to argue that the depository institutions would themselves have faced
difficulties obtaining credit had the pressures faced by the MMMFs not been resolved, but
this argument is forward-looking and does not appear to be persuasive. The AMLF was
created at a time when the MMMFs were the parties facing difficulties obtaining credit from
elsewhere. The transaction sought to respond to the MMMFs‘ liquidity concerns, not those
of the banks.
157. See SCOTT II, supra note 119, at 568-574 (discussing asset securitization and issues
that the financial crisis has raised with respect to credit markets).
158. Id.
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funded a substantial share of credit to consumers and businesses.‖159
Disruption of these markets could, in its view, ―significantly limit the
availability of credit to households and businesses of all sizes,‖ and so
contribute to a further weakening of economic activity. 160 In order to
reopen the ABS markets, and to further promote the flow of credit to
businesses and households, the Fed created the Term Asset-Backed
Securities Loan Facility (TALF) on November 25, 2008.161 It expired on
June 30, 2010.162
The TALF made loans to investors who purchased AAA-rated ABS.163
The securities themselves served as collateral for these loans, which were
made without recourse.164 Up to $200 billion was allocated to the
facility.165 Securities eligible for purchase included automobile loans,
credit card loans, and student loans.166 After an expansion of the program,
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) also became eligible for
purchase.167
Each loan was subject to a haircut. This haircut provided some
protection to the Fed. It also ensured that investors retained some monetary
stake in their purchases. In the event that investors did not repay their
loans, the Fed could sell their securities to TALF LLC, an SPV that it
created.168 The Treasury agreed to bear the first $20 billion of losses by
this SPV, by providing it with a loan in this amount. The Fed bore the
remainder.169

159. Fed. Red. Bank of N.Y., Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility: Frequently
Asked Questions (July 21, 2010), http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/talf_faq.html.
160. Id.
161. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Federal Reserve Announces
the Creation of the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) (Nov. 25, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20081125a.htm.
162. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., supra note 159.
163. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility: Terms and
Conditions
(July 21, 2010), http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/talf_terms.html
[hereinafter Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y. II].
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. Also included were loans guaranteed by the Small Business Administration,
loans relating to business equipment, leases of vehicle fleets, and insurance premium
finance loans. Id.
167. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Federal Reserve Announces
that Certain High-Quality Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities will become Eligible
Collateral under the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (May 19, 2009),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20090519b.htm.
168. Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y. II, supra note 163.
169. Id. After the program closed to new lending on June 30, 2010, this commitment
was later reduced to $4.3 billion. Id.
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Assessment

The TALF appears to have come within the scope of the Fed‘s § 13(3)
authority. The appropriate analysis is similar to that which we set out
above in the case of the AMLF.170 The Fed did not itself purchase
securities and bring them onto its own balance sheet. Instead, the Fed
sought to facilitate purchases of ABS by other private investors. For this
reason, the transactional structure is not the same as those that we
considered in the SPV cases above, where the Fed‘s SPV acquired the
assets at the outset.
However, there remains a concern about a loan to the party that needs
assistance. The borrowers (the private investors) were not the parties who
were unable to receive credit from elsewhere (those seeking to issue and
sell ABS).
C.

No legal authority: Lehman Brothers

Above, we considered a number of cases in which the Fed effected
both asset purchases and loan transactions. In all of these cases, the Fed
invoked its § 13(3) authority. However, there remains one important case
in which the Fed took no action under the statute. This is the case of
Lehman Brothers.
1.

Background

Lehman Brothers (―Lehman‖) was an investment bank that made large
investments in MBS. Like Bear Stearns, it started to face significant
liquidity problems when its creditors refused to lend against its assets. On
September 10, 2008, it announced a $3.9 billion quarterly loss.171 Its shares
had fallen 45% the previous day, and more than 90% since the beginning of
the year.172
The Fed did not use § 13(3) to provide credit to Lehman. Lehman
subsequently filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on September 15, 2008. The
Fed had made certain attempts to prevent this outcome. It has been stated
that the Fed tried to find a buyer for Lehman, and that there were two
potential candidates: Barclays Bank (―Barclays‖) and Bank of America.
Bank of America, however, eventually declined to enter into a deal –
170. See supra Part IV.B.3.ii (analyzing the transactional structure of the AMLF).
171. Ben White, Lehman sees $3.9 billion loss and plans to shed assets, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept.
10,
2010,
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/10/business/worldbusiness/10iht11lehman.16037408.html.
172. Id.
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possibly because it sought greater assistance than that which the
government was willing to provide.173 At the time, Bank of America was
also in negotiations to purchase Merrill Lynch. On September 14, 2008, it
announced that it would do so.
Thereafter, Barclays was the only remaining candidate. The Fed
declined to provide any public funding to Barclays. Instead, it put together
a consortium of investment banks.174 This consortium agreed to lend
billions of dollars to an SPV created by the Fed that would acquire
Lehman‘s illiquid assets. Barclays would then purchase Lehman‘s
remaining assets.175
However, there was a difficulty with the proposed transaction. Any
deal between Barclays and Lehman would take more than a month to close
after the contract had been signed. The Treasury insisted that Barclays
guarantee Lehman‘s trading obligations in the interim. Its concern was that
Lehman‘s partners would otherwise cease to do business with the firm, and
so render it worthless.176 Under U.K. stock-exchange listing rules, Barclays
would have to hold a shareholder vote before it could provide a
guarantee.177 However, there was insufficient time to hold such a vote. It
has also been suggested that the U.K. Financial Services Authority, after
consulting with the U.K. government, refused to waive this requirement.178
Ultimately, Lehman‘s holding company filed for bankruptcy.
However, while the proceedings were ongoing, Lehman‘s broker-dealer,
financed by loans from the PDCF, continued to operate.179 In the course of
the bankruptcy, Barclays ultimately purchased this broker-dealer (as well
as Lehman‘s U.S. office) for $1.75 billion.180
We can put forward two views about the Fed‘s decision-making in
Lehman‘s case. The first is a view that the Fed has expressed publicly:
that it had no legal authority to save Lehman. The second is that the Fed
did have this legal authority, but chose not to use it. We will examine each
of these views in turn.
173. See ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL 279, 300, 319 (2009) (stating that
Bank of America offered to share the first $1 billion of losses on Lehman‘s assets with the
government. It asked the government to bear a further $40 billion of losses, and later raised
this figure to $70 billion).
174. Id. at 302-03 (describing one of the working groups created to develop a structure
for investment in the failing bank).
175. Id. at 336 (stating that the consortium agreed to provide $33 billion in order to
absorb losses, so that Barclays could then acquire $3.5 billion of Lehman‘s more liquid
assets).
176. Id. at 324.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 346, 348 (suggesting that the U.K. government was concerned about
Lehman's exposure to risk and the limited information available in the circumstances).
179. Id. at 358.
180. Id. at 454-55.
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The Fed did not have the legal authority to save Lehman

In an October 2009 presentation at Harvard Law School, Thomas C.
Baxter, Jr., General Counsel to the New York FRB, set out the Fed‘s view
of its own legal authority. The Fed concluded that it could use § 13(3) to
lend and to purchase assets, but that it could not use it to provide an
ongoing guarantee for a private merger agreement.181
Ben Bernanke, the Chairman of the Fed‘s Board of Governors, had put
forward a different analysis based not on the absence of a guarantee but on
the inadequacy of Lehman‘s collateral. In a December 2008 speech in
Austin, he stated that Lehman‘s available collateral ―fell well short of the
amount needed to secure a Federal Reserve loan sufficient to pay off the
firm‘s counterparties and continue operations.‖182 He contrasted Lehman‘s
case with that of AIG, where there was sufficient collateral, and that of
Bear Stearns, where JPMorgan was willing to provide a guarantee of the
firm‘s trading obligations. Bernanke concluded that Lehman‘s failure was
―unavoidable, given the legal constraints.‖183
ii.

The Fed did have the legal authority to save Lehman, but
did not use it

Other commentators point to political rather than legal constraints.
They put forward the idea that the Fed may have had the legal authority to
save Lehman, but that it chose not to use it.184 In support, they cite
statements by Treasury and Fed officials at the time of Lehman‘s
bankruptcy.
For example, Hank Paulson, then Treasury Secretary, gave a press
conference on September 15, 2008 at which he stated that he ―never once
considered that it was appropriate to put taxpayer money on the line in
resolving Lehman Brothers.‖185 Furthermore, when speaking before the
Senate Committee on Banking later in September 2008, Ben Bernanke
181. Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., General Counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
Address at Harvard Law School‘s International Finance Seminar: Lessons Learned From the
Financial Crisis, Address (Oct. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Baxter II].
182. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Remarks at the Greater Austin
Chamber of Commerce, Austin, Texas (Dec. 1, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20081201a.htm.
183. Id.
184. See SORKIN, supra note 173, at 303 (stating that Timothy Geithner ―reiterated
[Hank] Paulson‘s decree: ‗There is no political will for a federal bailout.‘‖); WESSEL, supra
note 65, at 21-24 (describing the political pressure brought to bear on Paulson and Bernanke
after the rescue of Bear Stearns and quoting statements by a Fed official to the effect that a
decision was made to let Lehman fail).
185. Susanne Craig et al., AIG, Lehman Shock Hits World Markets, WALL ST. J., Sept.
16, 2008, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122152314746339697.html.
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stated that the Federal Reserve and the Treasury ―declined to commit
public funds‖ to support Lehman.186 Although Lehman‘s failure posed
risks, its troubles ―had been well known for some time, and investors
clearly recognized . . . that the failure of the firm was a significant
possibility.‖187 Thus, the Fed ―judged that investors and counterparties had
had time to take precautionary measures.‖188 It can be argued that these
comments reflect a deliberate political decision to let Lehman fail.189
Nevertheless, the Fed has not made any statement to this exact effect. In
fact, in his October 2009 presentation, Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., categorically
stated that no policymaker made a decision to let Lehman fail.190 One final
point made by commentators is that the Fed and the Treasury may have
prepared no alternatives to the Barclays transaction because they had
expected this deal to succeed.191
2.

Assessment

An assessment of the claim that Lehman‘s failure was rooted in
political rather than legal decision-making goes beyond the scope of the
present analysis. We also lack the information necessary to make such an
assessment. We shall therefore take the Fed‘s legal claims at face value
and evaluate only these. The first is that the Fed did not have the legal
authority to guarantee Lehman‘s ongoing obligations. Insofar as § 13(3) is
concerned with the provision of individual loans, this conclusion may be
correct.
However, we can make two points in response. First, the Fed‘s
approach is not dispositive. The logically prior question is whether the
ongoing guarantee of Lehman‘s assets – on which the Fed insisted – was
necessary in the first place. It is true that in the case of Bear Stearns,
JPMorgan did provide such a guarantee to creditors. The private
186. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Remarks before the Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate (Sept. 23, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/bernanke20080923a1.htm) (emphasis
added).
187. Id.
188. Id. A related point that Bernanke does not make expressly is that Lehman had had
access to the PDCF since March 16, 2008, and so would have been able to borrow from the
Fed if it had chosen to do so. See ROSS SORKIN, supra note 173, at 285 (―At least in the
Bear case, there was some legitimate fear of systemic risk. The Federal Reserve‘s discount
window hadn‘t yet been opened to investment banks, and so there was some chance of a
larger liquidity panic.‖) (quoting Lehman’s Fate, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2008, at A16,
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122117590254125801.html).
189. See SORKIN, supra note 173, at 282 (suggesting that Paulson sought to avoid the
―political liability of putting up government money for Lehman.‖).
190. Baxter II, supra note 181.
191. WESSEL, supra note 65, at 21.
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consortium in Lehman‘s case, on the other hand, did not. Its members only
agreed to acquire Lehman‘s illiquid assets so that Barclays could purchase
the rest. However, no such ongoing guarantee was given in the case of
AIG. This renders questionable the argument that such a guarantee was
necessary.
The second point is that the Fed could conceivably have made a large
series of loans to Lehman under § 13(3). These loans would have had the
same effect as that of an ongoing guarantee, ensuring that Lehman
continued to trade until the deal with Barclays closed. However, the
counter-argument is that such a step would not have been helpful. The
market had lost confidence in Lehman‘s ability to trade. For this reason,
providing a series of loans would not have resolved Lehman‘s
difficulties.192 This approach, however, moves away from arguments about
legal authority and towards arguments about practicality and
appropriateness of response. It does not convincingly demonstrate that a
series of loans would certainly have exceeded the limits of § 13(3).
The Fed‘s second claim, as articulated by Ben Bernanke, is more
persuasive. This is the claim that Lehman‘s assets would not have
provided sufficient collateral for a § 13(3) loan. We have seen that § 13(3)
requires financial instruments to be secured to the satisfaction of a Reserve
Bank. Therefore, a decision that a security constitutes insufficient
collateral is one that a Reserve Bank is entitled to make.
However, we can once more make two points in response. First, we
might question whether Lehman‘s assets would have remained insufficient
even after the private consortium had acquired its illiquid assets. It is
conceivable that after the involvement of the consortium, the Fed could
have guaranteed Lehman‘s trading obligations until the Barclays deal
closed. But the counter-argument is that the decision not to do so was
ultimately a judgment within the scope of the Fed‘s discretion. Again, we
lack the information necessary to assess the quality of Lehman‘s assets as
against those of Bear Stearns, or those of AIG, to which the Fed provided
credit one day later.
The second argument is stronger. Under the CPFF, the Fed purchased
unsecured commercial paper from issuers.193
Lehman‘s collateral,
insufficient though it might have been, would certainly have constituted
better security for a loan than an issuer‘s promise to pay.194

192. Baxter II, supra note 181.
193. See supra Part IV.A.2.
194. But see supra Part IV.A.2.ii (suggesting that the CPFF fees did constitute some
security for the loan).
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V.

CONGRESS‘S VISION FOR § 13(3): THE CASE FOR REFORM

So far, the purpose of our analysis has been to assess the Fed‘s actions
during the financial crisis against its statutory powers. We have argued that
§ 13(3) did not support the interpretative weight that the Fed then sought to
bring to bear on it. Where does this conclusion lead us?
One answer is that the point should be recognized expressly. Various
people associated with the Fed have made statements acknowledging that it
reached the bounds of its legislative mandate. For example, former Federal
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker said that the Fed ―judged it necessary to
take actions that [extended] to the very edge of its lawful and implied
powers.‖195 On the other hand, in 2009, Thomas C. Baxter, Jr., stated that
the Fed ―will do whatever it takes, within the bounds of the law, to deal
with [the] financial crisis.‖196 The conclusion of this Article is rather
different: that the Fed not only reached the bounds of its legislative
powers, but that it exceeded them.
Another answer is that it had become necessary to alter the legislation.
One option would have been to amend § 13(3) in order to give the Fed the
powers it sought to assume during the crisis. However, Congress, in
passing the Dodd-Frank Act, chose a different approach. This legislation
has made a number of important amendments to § 13(3). When we come
to analyze these below, we will see that they resolve a number of concerns
about the statute, even though others do remain.
To help us evaluate the reforms, we shall first set out the
counterfactual. What was the case for reform before Congress acted? In
particular, what vision did the legislature have for § 13(3) and how did the
Fed‘s activity depart from that vision? Once we have asked these
questions, we will be in a position to consider what effects the reforms
have had and whether they have been successful.
A.

The Intended Purpose of § 13(3)

Let us begin by asking what vision Congress might have had in
enacting § 13(3). How was it intended to be used? We saw above that the
section allowed the Fed, in times of emergency, to make secured loans to
entities that could not obtain credit from elsewhere. What sort of entities
might these be?
Commercial banks have always been able to borrow at the Fed‘s
discount window, and so they have no need for § 13(3). Investment banks,
195. Hal S. Scott, The Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System,
33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 671, 723 [hereinafter Scott III] (noting former Chairman
Volcker‘s concerns that the financial system had failed the test of the marketplace).
196. Baxter II, supra note 181.
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however, were not eligible for discount window loans at the time of the
crisis. As corporations, though, they were eligible for § 13(3) loans: either
by means of individual bailouts or under the PDCF. Even so, it should be
pointed out that the largest investment banks that survived the crisis are
now bank holding companies.197 As such, they can now borrow at the
discount window at any time. They are also subject to the Fed‘s oversight.
There remains one residual category: that of § 13(3) lending to
nonbanks. Under what sort of circumstances might the legislature have
envisaged this occurring? The most appropriate recipients of § 13(3) loans
would seem to be nonbanks with some significant connection to the
financial system. From the Fed‘s perspective, this is surely the most
relevant sense of ―unusual and exigent‖ circumstances. It is true, as we
saw above in our survey of the history of § 13(3) lending, that the Fed did
extend credit to industrial (rather than financial) nonbanks between 1932
and 1936. Even so, such industrial lending was limited in scope, and the
Fed ceded its role in this area to other entities.198 At present, it no longer
seems possible to conceive of the Fed‘s making a loan to a nonbank unless
the failure of such an entity would have a significant effect on the financial
system.
B.

Systemic risk

It follows from the above analysis that the concern underlying § 13(3)
was one about systemic risk. According to Scott, this term has two
meanings. First, there is the chain reaction problem: the possibility that
the failure of one entity will affect others. More precisely, this is the risk
that ―the failure of one significant financial institution [might] cause or
significantly contribute to the failure of other significant financial
institutions as a result of their linkages to each other.‖199
Second, there is the possibility of an exogenous shock that may have a
simultaneous impact on a number of financial institutions. These sources
of systemic risk are related: an exogenous shock can trigger a chain
reaction. At the time of the crisis, § 13(3) had an entity-specific focus that
permitted lending to individual entities as well as to groups. In this way, it
was well positioned to address both of these concerns.
Scott goes on to set out three causes of financial chain reactions.200
First, there are imitative runs. Here, after a bank fails, depositors in another
197. Namely Bank of America (which acquired Merrill Lynch), Goldman Sachs,
JPMorgan (which acquired Bear Stearns), and Morgan Stanley.
198. See supra Part III.B.1.
199. See Scott III, supra note 195, at 673 (discussing the reduction of systemic risk, and
noting that this is the central problem for financial regulation).
200. See SCOTT, supra note 94, at 11-12; see also Scott III, supra note 195, at 673–75.
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bank assume that their bank will also fail, and so they withdraw their funds.
Second, there are interbank deposits, where one bank places its deposits
with another. Finally, there is counterparty risk, or interconnectedness.
Scott points out that when we are considering nonbanks, this is the most
relevant source of systemic risk.201 Here, an institution may fail because its
counterparty cannot settle a derivative position. Even so, the extent of
losses (and failures) will depend on the value of the collateral that the
institution holds.202
What effects can systemic risk (and actions taken to prevent it) have?
One is a governmental bailout made at the taxpayers‘ expense. Another is
an increase in moral hazard. This is the concern that private institutions
that have been rescued by the government, or know that they will be, may
become less concerned about the effects of their own risk-taking. They
may take fewer steps to protect themselves against future losses.
Section 13(3) contained an important means of protection against
moral hazard. Entities receiving loans had to provide satisfactory
collateral. The Fed could also look to the assets of the borrower in the
event of a shortfall. In this way, the borrower, and not the Fed, would still
bear the main effects of its own risk-taking. Moreover, by making loans
only against satisfactory collateral, the Fed was also less likely to
experience losses. Thus, overall, the conditions for lending in § 13(3)
sought not only reduce moral hazard but also to protect the Fed itself.
It appears persuasive to say that at the time of the crisis and
beforehand, § 13(3) sought to contain systemic risk. But we must qualify
our conclusion in one important respect. Section 13(3) as enacted sought
only to contain systemic liquidity risks. For this reason, the Fed‘s role as a
systemic risk regulator was embryonic. When faced with the problem of a
chain reaction or an exogenous shock, the Fed could, according to the
statute, respond only by lending against satisfactory collateral. But during
the crisis, the Fed in fact used § 13(3) to respond to systemic insolvency
risks. It took on the role of systemic risk regulator as such, despite the
confines of the statute and its duties as a central bank.
One possible response is to argue that the flexibility that § 13(3)
provided to the Fed during the financial crisis proved advantageous. The
Fed was able to act quickly, long before Congress enacted EESA on

201. See SCOTT, supra note 94, at 12 (acknowledging that it is difficult to estimate the
severity of this form of risk, as well as the degree of interconnectedness among institutions).
202. For example, in March 2009, Goldman Sachs stated publicly that it had adequate
collateral to protect itself against the consequences of a default by AIG. Scott III, supra
note 195, at 675. Despite this, Goldman Sachs received the largest portion of the Fed‘s $85
billion loan to AIG. Id. Perhaps, then, AIG‘s rescue did not follow from concerns about
systemic risk as such but rather from concerns about the losses that AIG‘s investors would
have had to bear if the firm had failed.
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October 3, 2008.203 However, the Fed also made a series of ad hoc
decisions, rescuing some entities and letting others fail. And so the other
argument, with which Congress appears to have agreed, is that these
actions were problematic. A dedicated systemic risk regulator, had one
existed at the time, may have been able to act more quickly and coherently.
In fact, the Dodd-Frank Act creates such a specialized entity. We will
return to consider its role below.204
C.

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act

1. Overview: The Amendments to § 13(3)
We are now in a position to examine the amendments to § 13(3)
contained in the Dodd-Frank Act. This legislation makes a number of
changes to § 13(3). First, it sets out a clear vision of § 13(3) and its
function. Second, it prohibits lending to single and specific entities. Third,
it seeks to ensure that the Fed receives sufficient collateral for its loans.
Fourth, it requires input by the Treasury into the Fed‘s decision-making.
Finally, it sets out detailed reporting obligations. We will examine each of
these points in turn.
The first point concerns the newly stated purpose of the legislation.
As amended, § 13(3) now states that future emergency lending will occur
under a set of policies and procedures (to be established by regulation)
designed to ensure that ―any emergency lending program or facility is for
the purpose of providing liquidity to the financial system.‖205
The second point is that the Fed can no longer lend to ―any individual,
partnership, or corporation.‖ Instead, it can discount notes, drafts, and bills
of exchange for ―any participant in any program or facility with broadbased eligibility.‖206 Hence the Fed can no longer make loans to individual
entities. It cannot, by its emergency lending programs and procedures,
seek to ―aid a failing financial company,‖ or to ―remove assets from the
balance sheet of a single and specific company.‖207 Nor can it seek to help
a single and specific company avoid bankruptcy.208
This point is further emphasized by one of the criteria that the
Comptroller General must use when exercising his new powers to audit §
13(3) facilities (which we will discuss in greater detail below). The
203. The House of Representatives had earlier rejected EESA in bill form on September
29, 2008. Office of the Clerk, H.R., Final Vote Results for Roll Call (Sept. 29, 2008), 674,
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2008/roll674.xml.
204. See infra Part V.C.2.iii.
205. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1101, 12 U.S.C. §
5301 (2010).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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Comptroller must consider whether the credit facility ―inappropriately
favors one or more specific participants over other institutions eligible to
utilize the facility.‖209
The third amendment concerns collateral. The test in the previous
legislation is preserved. Once more, the financial instruments to be
discounted must be endorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of the
Federal Reserve Bank. However, further guidance now accompanies this
test. In determining whether a loan is satisfactorily secured, Reserve Banks
must now assign a ―lendable value‖ to all collateral that they receive for
their loans, in a manner consistent with ―sound risk management
practices.‖210 The security for emergency loans must be ―sufficient to
protect taxpayers from losses.‖211 Insolvent borrowers are expressly
prohibited from borrowing under the Fed‘s § 13(3) programs. We saw
above, when considering the distinction between targeted individual loans
and programs of broad-based eligibility, that the Fed cannot seek to aid
failing financial companies or to help them avoid bankruptcy.
The fourth amendment to § 13(3) ensures future executive input into
the Fed‘s decision-making. Before the Fed can establish any § 13(3)
program or facility, it must now obtain the approval of the Secretary of the
Treasury.212
Finally, by its other provisions, the Dodd-Frank Act seeks to ensure
that the Fed‘s past and future § 13(3) decision-making is made more
transparent.213 The Comptroller General now obtains the power to conduct
reviews and on-site examinations of the Fed, its Reserve Banks, and its
credit facilities, such as the SPVs established under § 13(3).214 The
Comptroller General may also assess the Fed‘s discount window lending
and its open-market operations. The relevant criteria are the adequacy of
financial reporting, the effectiveness of security and collateral policies, and,
as we have seen, whether the facilities inappropriately favor one or more
specific participants over others.215
The Government Accountability Office is also to conduct a one-time
audit of all the Fed‘s actions from December 1, 2007 until the date of the
209. Id. at § 1102.
210. Id. at § 1101.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Previous legislation had already sought to address such concerns. EESA § 129
required that the Fed, within seven days of invoking § 13(3), provide Congress with a report
justifying its actions and stating the terms under which it lent. Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 § 129 (2008). It had to update these reports every sixty days. Id.
But this obligation was limited in duration. It covered only the period from March 1, 2008
to October 3, 2008. Id.
214. Dodd-Frank Act § 1102.
215. Id.
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legislation‘s enactment.216 This audit will cover all of the Fed‘s § 13(3)
activities. The Fed itself is also subject to new disclosure obligations. By
December 1, 2010, it must publish on its website various details about its
past § 13(3) programs, such as the identity of those who received
assistance, the value of that assistance, and the specific rationale for each
program.217 The Fed will also be required to disclose information about its
future § 13(3) activities, and to publish this on its website after the
termination of its programs.218
2.

Assessment

We have seen that the Dodd-Frank Act makes a number of wideranging modifications to § 13(3). Overall, we will argue that these are to
be welcomed. Our analysis will proceed in three parts. First, we will set
out one remaining caveat as to the loan/asset-purchase distinction, the
status of which appears to remain ambiguous in the legislation. Second, we
will evaluate the thrust of the changes that the Act makes and attempt to
explain these in the light of the concerns we have previously raised. Third,
we will touch upon the systemic risk problem. We will seek to
demonstrate that § 13(3) has now resumed the role it was intended to have:
that of regulating systemic liquidity risks.
i.

A remaining ambiguity in the legislation

Throughout our analysis, we have argued that § 13(3) provides the
Fed with defined powers of limited scope. It may lend freely against
sufficient collateral, which is the classic function of a central bank.219 In
this way, it can provide liquidity to entities that are otherwise solvent. We
have also sought to demonstrate that § 13(3) does not support the full scope
of the Fed‘s past activity. Although the statute permits only secured
lending, the Fed also invoked it to purchase assets.
Does the current provision address this concern? It might, but the
point remains ambiguous. The newly amended § 13(3) preserves the basic
structure of the previous legislation. Once more, the Fed can discount
financial instruments for entities that cannot secure adequate credit from
216. Id. at § 1109.
217. Id.
218. Id. at § 1103.
219. KENNETH N. KUTTNER, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AS LENDER OF LAST RESORT DURING
THE PANIC OF 2008 1 (2008), available at
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/The_Federal_Reserve_as_Lender_of_Last_Resort_during_
the_Panic_of_2008.pdf (explaining that ―[t]here is a long history of central banks providing
liquidity during banking panics‖ and setting out Bagehot‘s view that a lender of last resort
should lend freely, but at a penalty rate, against good collateral).
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other banks. The amending legislation states that § 13(3) is a provision
about the Fed‘s ―emergency lending authority.‖220 It also states that the Fed
cannot use it to ―remove assets from the balance sheet of a single and
specific company.‖221 These provisions appear to support the loan/assetpurchase distinction that we have drawn throughout our analysis.
On the other hand, it can also be argued that the main emphasis of
these provisions lies elsewhere. Their purpose may be to ensure that the
Fed cannot discriminate between entities that are equally in need of
assistance. On this view, the Fed is prohibited from removing assets from
the balance sheet of a single and specific company – not from purchasing
assets per se.
Therefore, it can be argued that the Fed is still exercising its
―emergency lending powers‖ when it incorporates an SPV and then makes
loans to it for the purpose of purchasing assets. In fact, the amended
statute, with its requirement that the Fed establish schemes of ―broad-based
eligibility,‖ may even contemplate such asset purchases – so long as they
occur on a wide scale.
In other words, Congress‘s main concern may have been about the
distinction that the Fed drew between Bear Stearns, AIG, and issuers of
commercial paper on the one hand and Lehman on the other. Hence the
thrust of the newly amended legislation may be to proscribe arbitrary
decision-making rather than asset purchasing as such. If this is the correct
reading of Congress‘s intention, then this Article suggests that the true
interpretation of the statute should be otherwise. To the extent that the Fed
uses § 13(3) to circumvent restrictions elsewhere in the FRA, it exceeds the
bounds of its statutory authority.
Why do we emphasize this point? There are two reasons. These are
equally applicable in situations where the Fed lends against insufficient
collateral and where it purchases assets. The first concern is political. The
money that the Fed lends out under § 13(3) is not appropriated by the
conventional process. Furthermore, during the financial crisis, there was
no formal requirement for any executive supervision over the Fed‘s loanmaking activity.
The second concern is economic. To make a loan, the Fed prints
money, and so inserts high-powered money into the financial system.222 To
offset the effects of this increase in reserves, which would otherwise lead to
inflation, the Fed has to sell Treasury bills in the open market. In this way,

220. Id. at § 1101 (emphasis added).
221. Id. (emphasis added).
222. Unless it lends out Treasury bills against privately issued securities such as
performed at the TSLF. See supra Part IV.B.1. This exchange of securities has no effect on
the amount of reserves in the financial system. KUTTNER, supra note 219, at 5.
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it reduces the amount of money in the system.223 The difficulty is that the
Fed has a limited supply of Treasury bills. When its own supply runs out it
must seek more from the Treasury.224 But if the Fed becomes reliant on the
Treasury, it may no longer enjoy the same degree of independence to carry
out monetary policy.225
For these reasons, we might argue that the Fed should have no
authority to lend against insufficient collateral and to purchase assets.
These powers, if ever to be exercised, should go to another entity, such as
the Treasury. Such a step would ensure that funds are appropriated through
the political process. It would also ensure that bailouts do not have an
adverse effect on the money supply, because the Treasury can finance its
own spending with debt.
Congress has now accepted the first limb of this argument, seeking to
preclude the Fed‘s lending against insufficient collateral, but perhaps not
the second, which cautions against asset purchases. Even so, we can point
out that under the new statute, asset purchases by means of an SPV
structure would now be subject to stringent collateral requirements. In this
way, our concerns may now have been mitigated. Furthermore, there is
now executive input into the § 13(3) process, in the form of approval by the
Secretary of the Treasury. Therefore, the most important remaining
concern may be about legal authority.
ii.

A return to the lender of last resort model

Lending freely against sufficient collateral,226 and so acting as a lender
of last resort, is one of the classic functions of a central bank. 227 By its
actions, the central bank seeks to address liquidity concerns. It allows
solvent banks to keep operating when they would otherwise fail for lack of
reserves. We saw above that the Fed‘s lending to banks takes place at its
discount window. The satisfactory collateral requirement in § 13(3) went
223. In October 2008, after the enactment of EESA, the Fed was permitted to pay
interest on bank reserves. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act 2008 § 128 (2008). This
is another method of decreasing the amount of money in the system, because it encourages
banks to deposit money with the Fed.
224. In fact, during the financial crisis, the Treasury operated its Supplementary
Financing Program. It sold Treasury bills in the open market and deposited the proceeds
with the Federal Reserve. Press Release, U.S. Dep‘t. of Treasury, Treasury Announces
Supplementary
Financing
Program
(Sept.
17,
2008),
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1144.htm.
225. In response, we might question the extent to which the Fed really is independent.
Commentators suggest that the Treasury played a significant role in shaping the Fed‘s
actions (under § 13(3) and otherwise) during the financial crisis. See generally, e.g.,
SORKIN, supra note 173; WESSEL, supra note 65. .
226. But at a penalty rate. KUTTNER, supra note 219, at 1.
227. Id.
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some way towards aligning the Fed‘s role as a regulator for systemic
liquidity risks with its role as lender of last resort at the discount window.228
However, we also saw that the statutory terms at the time of the crisis
were imprecise. Was ―secured to the satisfaction of the Federal Reserve
Bank‖229 an entirely subjective test? We pointed out above that it could
conceivably require no collateral. But we argued that it could not operate
in this way: at the very least, the borrower would have to provide some
security.230
What about transactions in which the Fed made § 13(3) loans against
collateral of low quality? These would appear to have been acceptable
under the terms of the statute at the time the Fed used it. In such cases, by
definition, there is a substantial likelihood that the loan will not be repaid in
full. Consequently, the Fed is likely to incur losses. These are ultimately
borne by the taxpayer, because the Fed remits the profits it makes to the
Treasury.231
The Dodd-Frank Act responds to these concerns. It realigns § 13(3)
once more with the classic function of a central bank: lending freely
against sufficient collateral. As we saw above, the provision‘s expressly
stated purpose is now to help the Fed provide liquidity to the financial
system. The Act also seeks to clarify the ambiguity as to collateral in the
previous legislation. Satisfactory collateral is that which is sufficient to
protect taxpayers from losses.232 A Reserve Bank is required to apply
―lendable values‖ to all the collateral it receives,233 so it can no longer be
argued that the test is wholly subjective.
The approach taken in the Dodd-Frank Act is preferable to that in the
earlier House Bill, which has been discarded. For the purposes of that Bill,
in order to meet the ―secured to the satisfaction‖ standard, a Reserve
Bank‘s governors would have to have believed there was a ―99 percent
likelihood‖ that both the interest and the principal on the relevant loan
would be repaid.234 The Bill would also have capped § 13(3) lending at $4

228. In the case of nonbanks, the Fed‘s loans seek to provide liquidity in the sense of
short-term funding, rather than in the sense of reserves. Id. at 4.
229. Federal Reserve Act § 13(3) (emphasis added).
230. See supra Part II.F.
231. For example, in 2009, the Fed made a profit of $52.1 billion. Of this, $46.1 billion
went to the Treasury. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Reserve Bank
Income and Expense Data and Transfers to the Treasury for 2009 (Jan. 12, 2010),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/other/20100112a.htm.
232. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 1101, 12 U.S.C. §
5301 (2010). Presumably, the collateral must be sufficient to protect taxpayers from losses
as to both the principal and the interest, but the provision does not specify this.
233. Id.
234. The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111 th
Cong. § 1701 (2009).
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trillion.235 Finally, in order to lend under § 13(3), the Fed would have
required the approval not only of the Secretary of the Treasury and the
President but also of the majority of the members of the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC).236
These rejected proposals would have set out a series of high
procedural hurdles for the Fed to meet before it could engage in lending.
They would also have capped the extent of its lending powers. However,
as Scott points out, after we put in place appropriate restrictions on
collateral, there is little need for other procedural hurdles.237 Again, one of
the functions of a central bank is to provide liquidity in times of
emergency. The extent to which we should politicize the Fed‘s ordinary
activities (when it makes loans against sufficient collateral) is therefore
questionable.
On this view, we might also wish to question whether the Dodd-Frank
Act ought to have incorporated the requirement for the Fed to seek
Treasury approval before it can make § 13(3) loans. The most persuasive
response is that this may be a helpful check, and that approval is unlikely to
be withheld in the appropriate circumstances.
iii. Systemic risk regulation
Above, we suggested § 13(3) has always been concerned with the
provision of liquidity to the financial system. However, during the
financial crisis, the Fed used it in a different way. By creating SPVs to
purchase assets, the Fed assumed the role of a regulator for systemic
solvency risks.
The problem is that § 13(3) as it then stood did not provide an
overarching framework for systemic risk regulation. It was susceptible to
use on an ad hoc basis, and the Fed did so use it during the crisis. As a
result, it is difficult to draw from its actions any coherent set of principles
by which to predict future decision-making. On the other hand, it is
arguable that predictability in decision-making was necessarily difficult to
achieve given the time constraints and the complexity of the crisis.
The concern about ad hoc (and perhaps arbitrary) decision-making
explains one of the key changes made to § 13(3) by the Dodd-Frank Act.
We saw above that the Act prohibits lending to single and specific entities.
The Fed can instead establish only programs of broad-based eligibility.
235. Id. Although it was not clear whether this referred to any given loan transaction or
to loans made over a certain period (such as the lifetime of the provision).
236. Id.; infra Part V.C.2.iii.
237. See Scott III, supra note 195, at 725 (―To the extent that the Federal Reserve is
loaning against adequate high quality collateral, these procedural safeguards are overkill and
unnecessarily limit the independence and flexibility of the Fed to respond to crisis.‖).
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But, given all that we have said above about the permissible containment of
systemic liquidity risks, does this modification not appear problematic?
Let us imagine that we are faced with a chain reaction problem. Only one
entity is illiquid and so requires a loan. However, if it fails, many others
will also fail. Here, providing credit to that entity alone would be precisely
the right step to take. But § 13(3) as amended precludes the Fed from
taking such a step.
There are two possible responses to the concern we have just raised.
The first is to say that it will be rare for one institution alone to require
help. For this reason, it is usually of greater help to the financial system
when the Fed develops wider-reaching programs for a number of
institutions. But this argument merely sidesteps the concern instead of
addressing it.
The more persuasive response is to consider another important
legislative step that Congress has taken in the Dodd-Frank Act. It has
demonstrated a preference for ex ante solutions to systemic risk concerns.
It has created a new systemic risk regulator: the Financial Stability
Oversight Council (FSOC). The members of this body are the Secretary of
the Treasury, the Chairman of the Fed‘s Board of Governors, the Chair of
the FDIC, and the Director of the new Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection, as well as other federal and state regulators and an independent
member with insurance expertise.238
The FSOC may require nonbank financial companies to come under
the supervision of the Fed if their failure could, by reason of their size,
nature, or interconnectedness, pose a threat to U.S. financial stability. 239
Also, pursuant to a declaration of systemic risk,240 it may itself order the
liquidation of failing financial companies that pose a significant risk to U.S.
financial stability. This must take place in a manner that mitigates risk and
minimizes moral hazard.241
A full analysis of the powers of the FSOC lies beyond the scope of
this Article. Suffice it to say that § 13(3) is no longer the chief legislative
means of regulating systemic risks. This role has now passed to another
body established precisely for this purpose.
D.

The way forward

Kuttner argues that giving bailout duties to the Fed ―obscures its core
objectives‖ and ―unnecessarily [links] monetary policy to the rescue of
238. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 111, 12 U.S.C. §
5301 (2010).
239. Id. at § 113.
240. Id. at § 203.
241. Id. at § 204.
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failing institutions.‖242 The premise of this argument is that the Fed should
only be a lender of last resort: it should engage only in collateralized
lending to solvent entities. Throughout our analysis, we have seen that this
restricted view of the Fed‘s § 13(3) powers finds strong textual support in
the statute itself. And Congress has now made it entirely clear that § 13(3)
must only be used to respond to concerns about liquidity.
But what of bailout duties? Are they not – at least in some sense –
inextricably linked with the Fed‘s core duties? Its express goals in carrying
out monetary policy are to maintain economic growth and to promote
maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest
rates.243
Even so, we have seen that there are strong arguments against the
Fed‘s being able to protect the financial system by all conceivable means.
It should not be able to lend against insufficient or no collateral. Congress
has now accepted these arguments. The Fed retains its power to provide
liquidity to the financial system. And the FSOC now obtains the power to
resolve systemically important nonbanks (as well as to require the Fed‘s
supervision of such entities).
Above, we have sought to argue that the advantage of moving asset
purchase and unsecured lending powers away from § 13(3) and to some
other legislation is that future decision-making is thus likely to occur under
a more coherent and comprehensive set of rules. And if any funds are to be
used to aid insolvent institutions (a step that Congress has expressly
rejected in the Dodd-Frank Act),244 they will have to be appropriated by a
clear process.
Two points remain to be made by way of conclusion. The first is that
the recent amendments to § 13(3) are to be welcomed. They resolve a
number of ambiguities in the statute. They also realign the Fed‘s role with
that of a central bank, classically conceived. However, there may remain
an ambiguity in the statute as to asset purchases. The position taken in this
Article is that these do not fall within the scope of § 13(3), and ideally
should not, however broad-based a program of participation the Fed might
decide to create. Nevertheless, the amended rules about satisfactory
collateral appear to mitigate many of the concerns raised. Even so, it
should also be pointed out that these legislative amendments only resolve
concerns as to the future. The effects of the Fed‘s past activity still remain.
The second point is that the creation of a dedicated systemic risk
regulator in the form of the FSOC, acting together with the Fed, is also to
be welcomed. If the FSOC is provided with a coherent set of principles by
which to operate, the effect will be greater stability in decision-making than
242. See KUTTNER, supra note 219, at 12.
243. Federal Reserve Act § 2a, 12 U.S.C. § 225a (2006).
244. See supra Part V.C.1.
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was ever attainable under § 13(3).
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has considered the Federal Reserve‘s emergency
decision-making during the financial crisis. It has analyzed § 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act, a legislative power that the Fed used extensively
when formulating its responses to the crisis.
By way of background, it traced the historical development and use of
this provision. Next, it sought to assess its scope. It concluded that at the
time of the crisis, § 13(3) permitted the Fed to make secured loans to
entities that could not obtain credit from other sources. With this view of
the statute in mind, it analyzed a number of the transactional structures that
the Fed created during the financial crisis. It concluded that the Fed‘s asset
purchases and its loans against corporate shares exceeded the bounds of its
statutory authority.
Finally, it considered the intended purpose of the legislation: the
containment of systemic liquidity (rather than solvency) risks by means of
secured lending against sufficient collateral. It evaluated the reforms of §
13(3) in the Dodd-Frank Act, and concluded that these are to be welcomed
overall. They set out a clear vision for § 13(3) and resolve a number of
concerns. Even so, an important ambiguity as to the Fed‘s ability to
purchase assets remains in the law. In closing, this Article then traced the
authority of the FSOC, a new entity created by the Act that now acts
together with the Fed in the sphere of systemic risk regulation.

